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Nuclear Nonproliferation & Russian Nuclear Privatization 
PREFACE 
The atomic energy sector in Russia faces an uncertain future. Minatom is the 
Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia. It controls all of the nuclear activities both defense 
and non-defense. Because of this it is the focal point of the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 
initiatives in Russia. Minatom is proposing to separate its defense and non-defense lines 
and privatize the non-defense activities in hopes of making them a commercial success. 
The energy sector in Russia has been racked by institutional failure and scandal. As a 
consequence the country lacks dependable supplies of power, which seriously threatens 
economic growth. Minatom claims that its restructuring and privatization initiatives will 
help provide the energy the country needs for the future. However, serious problems 
threaten the commercial success of Minatom’s ventures: Neither electricity sales nor nu-
clear power plant construction are profit-making enterprises currently. Moreover, nuclear 
fuel processing is not as lucrative as it once was due to sharp declines in the world price 
of nuclear fuel. 
The current wholesale price of electricity in Russia at best barely covers the oper-
ating cost of nuclear generators. For power sold to neighboring countries the wholesale 
price is slightly above the operating cost of nuclear generators, but it is still far below the 
capital cost of new capacity. Minatom cannot expand domestic nuclear generation unless 
the wholesale price of electricity within Russia increases dramatically or unless it re-
ceives increased subsidies from some source. 
Nuclear power is not a sure winner against conventional generation technologies. 
Hence, even if electricity prices increase to competitive levels, competition itself may 
significantly curtail the plans for expansion of generation capacity and output within Rus-
sia. Similarly, Minatom cannot make its foreign nuclear construction ventures a commer-
cial success unless it raises the price of construction. 
Minatom makes money from its fuel processing activities, especially the HEU 
deal with the U.S. However, as the world price of nuclear fuel has declined, so too have 
these revenues. Hopes of expanding the fuel processing activities require costly technical 
development and are not likely to be fulfilled. 
On top of this, the proposed privatization of the non-defense, nuclear enterprises 
only increases the risk of nuclear proliferation through the threat of corruption, foreign 
involvement in nuclear material control issues, and the increased likelihood of reckless 
behavior in the face of financial distress. 
If Minatom is not able to raise significant funds from private investors and if pri-
vatization has the all too common effect of diverting cash into private pockets, the money 
from U.S. sources with its attendant oversight will become increasingly important in 
achieving U.S. national security goals. This money helps directly to control nuclear pro-
liferation, and it helps to stabilize the Russian economy through the nuclear sector, which 
comprises a substantial portion of the energy resources of the country. Taken as a whole, 
the picture is one in which the value of U.S. hard-cash infusion into Minatom will likely 
have an important stabilizing effect on the operation of the atomic energy sector and pro-
duce spillover benefits throughout the Russian economy. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Russia's atomic energy minister, Aleksandr Rumyantsev, said this evening 
he had had a meeting with President Vladimir Putin earlier in the day to 
inform him on plans to set up a separate power generating company in the 
nuclear sector. The emergence of a generating company that would em-
brace the Russian nuclear power plants “could help consolidate positions 
of the atomic energy sector in the market economic system,” Rumyantsev 
said. [ITAR-TASS, 11 Nov 01] 
Restructuring and reform in the Russian energy sector are changing 
economic incentives and hence the behavior of key organizations and espe-
cially the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). These changes will have a 
direct impact on the national security interests of the United States and in 
particular U.S. nuclear nonproliferation initiatives. 
Minatom’s aim is to unify its major non-defense activities–power 
generation, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear fuel processing– 
into one profit center. The commercial success of this venture is the key to 
Minatom’s future. If Minatom founders on the rocks of market competition 
in its nuclear enterprises, it will be much more sensitive to U.S. programs 
that channel hard cash to its departments and divisions. On the other hand, if 
the nuclear power enterprises prosper, Minatom will be less dependent on 
the revenues flowing from U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs. Under-
standing the underlying economics of restructuring and privatization at Mi-
natom will help assess the cost effectiveness of the many nuclear nonprolif-
eration initiatives. 
Minatom is a large and powerful political and economic force in Rus-
sia. It controls all of the nuclear activities in Russia. These include nuclear 
power generation and power plant construction, nuclear fuel reprocessing, 
certain other nuclear technology initiatives, and maintenance and control of 
nuclear weapons. 
Minatom’s new chief, Atomic Energy Minister Alexander 
Rumyantsev, seems prepared to follow the plan developed over the last sev-
eral years to expand the role of nuclear energy in Russian. This means pro-
duce more electricity and sell it to the highest bidder, build more nuclear 
power plants at home and abroad, and expand nuclear fuel initiatives. How-
ever, these goals depend on restructuring Minatom and privatizing elements 
of the nuclear industry as well as on reform in the Russian energy sector. 
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Minatom claims to be positioning itself for privatization efforts that 
will include direct foreign investment in some of its business ventures be-
cause this is the only way that it can obtain the financial capital necessary to 
undertake the investment projects that it has planned. Foreign investment in 
the nuclear industry has the potential to revitalize the sector but it may also 
weaken control over nuclear material and technologies. 
The fortunes of Minatom are not certain. There is no guarantee of fis-
cal stability for this ministry in the face of reform and restructuring in the 
electric and gas industries. There is a basic instability in the energy sector as 
a result of competitive restructuring that can cause Minatom to either profit 
wildly or to verge on financial catastrophe. Privatization of Minatom will 
heighten this effect. In the event of financial distress, privatization will un-
doubtedly induce more reckless behavior both financially and in the control 
of nuclear material. 
Minatom is promoting nuclear power both within Russia and interna-
tionally. The plan is elaborate and extensive. However, there is a funda-
mental question of its viability. Is nuclear power economically efficient? 
Will Russia be able to make a profit from building nuclear plants in other 
countries? Are new technologies in nuclear power generation and fuel proc-
essing economically feasible? Could reform of the gas industry cause nu-
clear power to fail the market test in the face of cheaper natural-gas com-
bined-cycle turbine power plants? How will reform in the electric industry 
affect cash flows and investment in nuclear power? 
Sector-wide reform is underway. The non-payment problem in the en-
ergy industry is being brought under control. Both the gas and electric com-
panies (Gazprom and UES) are collecting most of their bills in cash and 
have begun to settle accounts between each other. There is still an issue of 
debts owed by UES to the nuclear generators (Rosenergoatom), but cash 
payments from UES to Rosenergoatom likely will soon be 100 percent for 
current invoices. The restructuring of the electric industry is on schedule. 
The plan is to have a fully functioning wholesale market in place by 2004. 
The overhaul of the electricity sector is crucial to the expansion and 
growth of the economy. Energy is an essential input for commerce and in-
dustry. If there is not an abundant and reliable supply of electricity the po-
tential growth of the Russian economy will be hampered. The restructuring 
of the electricity sector is intended to create the climate and institutions that 
will attract private investment and boost supply of electric generation. The 
question for Minatom is whether the economics of nuclear energy will make 
it attractive financially relative to other technologies. 
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Corruption has been rampant in Russia highlighted by extensive asset 
shifting throughout the energy sector. However, openness and transparency 
seem to be the new mantra for joint-stock enterprises. President Putin re-
placed the head of Minatom in March and the head of Gazprom in May 
2001. At Gazprom, he specifically installed his own man and explicitly 
charged him to clean up Gazprom’s finances. If corruption can be brought 
under control, it will do two things: first, it will make private foreign in-
vestment in Russia more attractive; and second, it will relieve some of the 
concern about privatization of nuclear enterprises. 
Even so, privatization and foreign investment in the Russian nuclear 
sector fundamentally depends on the economics of the nuclear enterprises. 
Minatom is wagering its future on three non-defense business ven-
tures¾nuclear power production, nuclear power plant construction, and nu-
clear fuel initiatives. Each of these ventures is questionable in light of the 
changing institutions in the Russian energy sector. The problems and possi-
bilities can be outlined as follows. 
Electric Power 
Electric energy sales generate a large portion of Minatom’s 
budget¾over one-third. Even so, nuclear generation is arguably a money 
losing proposition. Estimates indicate that the operation, maintanence, and 
fuel cost of a standard nuclear power plant in Russia is around 1¢/kWh, of 
which fuel costs are about half. The recent wholesale electricity price has 
been less than this. Nuclear power plants in Russia have not been and may 
not currently be recovering the out-of-pocket cost of production. 
Two questions are raised: How can the nuclear generators operate if 
their revenues are less than operating cost? One answer is that much of the 
costs of nuclear generation, such as fuel and engineering services, are debits 
and credits within Minatom’s budget, so Minatom is simply writing off 
some of the losses. Another, more disturbing possibility is that the nuclear 
plants are not being adequately maintained. The second question is, How 
long can a situation like this go on? If Minatom is internally subsidizing 
nuclear generation, this can go on so long as the funds can be found 
elsewhere in the budget. However, if there are deficiencies in maintenance, 
the plants eventually must be brought up to standard or risk nuclear accident. 
In either case, the implications are discouraging in terms of 
Minatom’s economic vitality. Even though electricity sales make up a large 
share of Minatom’s budget, electric generation is not a cash cow. Our 
conclusion is that unless reform in the electricity market increases the 
wholesale price, nuclear power sales are unlikely to provide enough money 
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into the future to properly maintain the nuclear plants much less offer 
support to Minatom’s other ventures. 
One avenue for increasing revenues may be through international 
sales. Minatom is actively pressing to sell more electricity outside of Russia. 
It has been engaged in a long-running battle with UES, which controls the 
grid and also owns most of the conventional generators in the country. UES 
has been unwilling to allow Minatom to independently market power. The 
reasons are simple. First, UES wants to have nuclear power capacity at its 
disposal in satisfying domestic demand. This is valuable because UES does 
not always pay 100 percent hard currency for the nuclear power that it takes. 
Second, to the extent that excess capacity exists inside Russia, UES wants to 
sell this power internationally and collect the revenues for itself. 
By and large, the forces of reform and reorganization in the electric 
industry are moving in Minatom’s favor. Recently, both the Ministry of 
Monopoly and the Federal Energy Commission ruled against UES and in 
favor of Minatom to allow it to sell electricity across the border. 
However, this alone will not solve the problem of inadequate 
wholesale tariffs. International sales of Russian electricity imply that there is 
some excess capacity in the Russian system in some regions and at some 
times during the electricity demand cycle. Even so, it is not possible 
economically or politically and probably not feasible physically for the grid 
operator to allow electricity to flow to foreign countries if there are domestic 
power shortages that could be assuaged by this capacity. Ultimately, the only 
solution is increased domestic prices. Possibly, but not certainly, the 
evolving reform of the wholesale electric market will yield this result. 
Nuclear Power Plant Construction⎯Domestic 
Nuclear power currently provides about 15 percent of Russia’s power. 
Minatom hopes to expand this to 20 percent over the next 7 years. To do so, 
it anticipates building four more nuclear plants and refurbishing several of 
the existing reactors. However, just like energy sales nuclear power plant 
construction depends critically on increases in the wholesale electric price, 
but even this may not be enough. 
Nuclear power competes with natural gas and to a lesser extent with 
coal and oil in Russia as a fuel source for heat and electricity. Russia has the 
world’s largest natural gas reserves. Minatom has long argued that the most 
profitable strategy is to export natural gas to western Europe and produce 
electricity in Russia using nuclear fuel. However, whether nuclear power is 
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more efficient than natural gas generation even in this scenario is 
questionable. 
Consider the problem from the point of view of an investor. Assume 
that the wholesale electricity market is reorganized so that there is some 
reasonable chance of making a profit by building new electric generating 
plants in Russia. Would an investor be more likely to put money into a 
nuclear plant or a natural gas generator? 
In the U.S., there is no doubt. Natural gas turbines are state-of-the-art 
in electricity generation. They are a superior investment to coal units almost 
universally and overwhelmingly dominate nuclear power because of its 
regulatory debilities. While the regulatory climate in Russia is much more 
favorably disposed to nuclear power, our assessment is that even in Russia 
nuclear power will lose out among investors to natural gas generation. Based 
plainly on the economics, gas-fired generation will dominate nuclear power. 
We come to this conclusion based on our estimates of the full cost of 
electric power. The cost of electricity in Russia from a new nuclear 
generator is 4.8¢/kWh while a natural gas generator needs only 4.2¢/kWh to 
recover its cost. Moreover, the natural gas estimate assumes that fuel for 
these generators is priced at the current export level so the gap between 
nuclear power and natural gas generation is not a result of gas subsidies. 
Even if the assumptions underlying the cost estimates are changed in 
ways that favor nuclear power, given the huge investment cost of a nuclear 
reactor and the obvious uncertainties in the legal and property rights system, 
it is hard to imagine that Minatom will find it easy to attract foreign 
investment for nuclear generation ventures. Gas is too cheap, the generation 
technology is too simple, and the risk exposure is so much less. 
Recognize that for either of these technologies, the current wholesale 
price of electricity in Russia is but a trivial fraction. Without significant 
reform in the sector, no form of electric generation capacity is a good 
investment. The wholesale electric market must be restructured in order to 
keep the lights on in Russia. But even if reform is able to increase rates to 
levels that reflect the true cost of production, expansion of nuclear capacity 
is still a questionable entrepreneurial venture. 
Nuclear Power Plant Construction⎯International 
Regardless of the economic efficiency of nuclear power in Russia, 
Minatom is actively promoting nuclear power plant construction internation-
ally. Currently, there are Russian nuclear power construction projects un-
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derway in Iran, China, India. It is very unlikely that these projects would 
float on their own bottom as private-market economic ventures. 
By our estimates, the base construction cost in Russia of a VVER-
1000 plant is $2.2 billion including the interest cost during construction. 
Our comparison of this cost to the amounts that Minatom is reportedly re-
ceiving for these construction activities suggests a significant shortfall. 
In China, Minatom is involved in the construction of two VVER-
1000s. The total project is valued at $3.2 billion. Russia is supplying the 
technology and the reactor. China is responsible for construction and instal-
lation. Russia is to receive $2.4 billion of which it is providing long term fi-
nancing for $1.3 billion at an interest rate of 4 percent. This interest rate is 
too low; it does not adequately cover the risk of such a project. In addition, 
we know that Russia is providing some of the construction financing. The 
stated contract price barely covers the estimated cost of the equipment cost. 
Given what appear to be the financing terms, this construction venture is not 
a profit-making enterprise. 
The Indian project also involves two VVER-1000s units. The total 
cost of the project is set at $3 billion. Russia is responsible for the design 
and 90 percent of the construction and materials at the announced contract 
price of $2 billion. The apparent shortfall may be explained on the basis of 
lower construction costs in India than in Russia, but it is unlikely that the re-
ported contract price is sufficient to offset the actual cost. 
Finally, there is the Iranian reactor at Bushehr. In 1995, Russia agreed 
to complete construction of this facility and install a VVER-1000 for a cost 
of $800 million. The plant reportedly will be completed in 2002. It is not 
clear whether the fee has escalated over time. If not, it is too low. Also, there 
is talk of building three additional units at this site for an additional cost of 
$1.2 billion each. Again, by our estimates this is well below the full cost. 
Nuclear Fuel 
Minatom is engaged in a number of nuclear fuel projects. In addition 
it is exploring the possibility of becoming a global spent fuel repository. 
Russia is a major world supplier of nuclear reactor fuel. Expansion of nu-
clear fuel projects is one of Minatom’s strategic goals. 
By our estimates, Russia currently sells over $1 billion worth of nu-
clear fuel per year. Part comes from enrichment of natural uranium and re-
processing of spent fuel. Part comes from a joint project with the U.S. called 
the HEU deal. 
The HEU deal is a project under which Russia down-blends highly 
enriched, weapons-grade uranium into nuclear fuel and then sells this to the 
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U.S. The original terms of the deal called for payments of $12 billion over 
20 years. Some $2 billion has been paid to date. However, given the current 
world price of nuclear fuel and the incentive structure of USEC, the U.S. 
agent in charge of the purchases, the terms of the payments are likely to 
move against Minatom. Nonetheless, the HEU project will remain a major 
source of hard currency. 
Nuclear fuel enrichment services are an important cash generating ac-
tivity for Minatom. However, the expansion of fuel initiatives beyond the 
ones that are currently profitable is problematic. These new projects include 
MOX fuel fabrication, refitting VVER plants to burn MOX, and spent-fuel 
storage, among others. Both the MOX fabrication and refitting projects must 
be considered speculative because they are based on Russian technologies 
that are as yet unproven. This does not mean that the technologies are un-
likely to perform, but that extensive and costly research must be done before 
these projects can be implemented. Even then, most studies indicate that 
MOX is not economically efficient compared to enrichment of natural ura-
nium, even including the savings in storage of nuclear wastes. Funds for the 
projects are not obviously available in Minatom’s budget and promises of 
international funding have not materialized. 
The spent-fuel project is somewhat further along. Initial testing was 
completed at the Mayak facility in 2001, but a number of hurdles remain, 
including quieting political pressure from grass-roots organizations through-
out Russia that are opposed to turning Russia into a nuclear waste repository. 
It is worth noting that these groups have some legal forces on their side be-
cause Russian law prohibits the importation of nuclear waste for purposes of 
permanent storage. However, the slit in the tent through which the camel’s 
nose has appeared is the claim that spent fuel will be imported for re-
processing purposes. Minatom claims that nuclear waste storage could be-
come a lucrative business venture, which may be true if the nuclear nonpro-
liferation issues are sufficiently discounted. 
Privatization 
Privatization of the Russian nuclear sector poses a number of ques-
tions and concerns from the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation. Some 
are obvious: Private ownership of nuclear activities will create the incentive 
to breach nuclear material control protocols in order to make a profit. This 
threat exist even now. Its extent is unclear but troublesome. 
However, there are other aspects of the problem that may be even 
more of a threat. The routine of privatization in Russia over the last decade 
is corruption and asset shifting. Should privatization of the atomic energy 
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industry follow the same pattern, siphoning of cash from atomic enterprises 
increases the potential for disaster in the maintenance and control of nuclear 
material. Moreover, nuclear enterprises are a ripe fruit for corruption: Most 
nuclear enterprises have high front-end investment costs where questionable 
procurement practices can be used to divert cash to insiders. And once in 
operation, nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants have low operating 
costs allowing for cash to drain away without immediately upsetting pro-
duction. 
Privatization in other sectors of the Russian economy, and especially 
in the energy sector, has been a vehicle for corruption and asset shifting. If 
funds from the cash generating activities of Minatom are diverted into pri-
vate pockets, the likelihood of financial crisis within Minatom will be sig-
nificantly heightened. In the event that privatization breeds corruption, 
money from U.S. initiatives in Russia that comes with oversight and control 
will be even more crucial in steadying the course of the ministry. 
Conclusions 
Based on our analysis, Russia’s nuclear sector is steaming into an un-
certain economic fog and very possibly toward the shoals of financial dis-
tress. We draw this conclusion from our review of the restructuring of the 
Russian energy sector, restructuring within Minatom, and its own non-
defense business enterprise initiatives: electricity generation, nuclear power 
plant construction, and nuclear fuel processing. 
Reform of the energy sector may yield benefits for Minatom in the 
short run but will expose the nuclear sector to the harsh realities of competi-
tion in the long run. Hopefully, reform of the wholesale electricity market 
will result in cash flows sufficient to provide adequate maintenance so that 
the existing plants will continue to produce. However, it is possible that the 
cash flows will not be large enough to allow for major upgrades in equip-
ment. Considering both capital and operating costs, nuclear power does not 
look particularly attractive from an investment perspective compared to 
other energy options even if wholesale rates increase to cost-recovery levels. 
The fundamentals of nuclear power that confront Russia domestically 
are also at play internationally. Although Russia is engaged in several power 
plant construction projects, they are of dubious value. The terms under 
which these projects are engaged do not appear to be cost effective. It ap-
pears that Russia has agreed to build these facilities at a loss. Possibly this 
was done to pursue foreign policy objectives. Possibly, this was done to gain 
a presence in the international nuclear construction market. At all events, 
Minatom will have to charge more in the future to make these ventures a 
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commercial success. Finally, the nuclear fuel processing business is unlikely 
to generate as much revenue in the future as it has in the past. 
For all of these reasons, it is likely that the U.S. initiatives that provide 
Minatom with hard cash will have greater leverage over the next five to ten 
years. If Minatom is not able to raise significant funds from private investors 
and if privatization has the all too common effect of diverting cash into pri-
vate pockets, the money from U.S. sources with its attendant oversight will 
become increasingly important in achieving U.S. national security goals. 
This money helps directly to control nuclear proliferation, and it helps to 
stabilize the Russian economy through the nuclear sector, which comprises a 
substantial portion of the energy resources of the country. Taken as a whole, 
the picture is one in which the value of U.S. hard-cash infusion into Mina-
tom will likely have an important stabilizing effect on the operation of the 
atomic energy sector and produce spillover benefits throughout the Russian 
economy. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
This research studies the impact of the institutional restructuring of Russia's nu-
clear sector on the nuclear nonproliferation goals and objectives of the United States. The 
basic hypothesis is the following: Reform and especially privatization in Russia is 
changing the economic incentives and will change the future behavior of the key organi-
zations in the energy sector. Investigation of these changing incentives and the underly-
ing economic forces will offer a clearer understanding of the future behavior of Russia's 
Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). Our focus is on the restructuring and reform 
within Minatom as well as restructuring that is occurring broadly across the energy sector 
because the behavior of all of these enterprises is interrelated. 
Minatom is a large and powerful political and economic force in Russia. Minatom 
controls all of the nuclear activities in Russia. These include nuclear power plants, nu-
clear fuel reprocessing, and certain other nuclear technology initiatives, in addition to the 
maintenance and control of nuclear weapons. Over one million people are said to be 
linked to Minatom. 
In the years since the breakup of the Soviet Union, there has been a movement 
towards privatization of industries and business activities. In the early 1990s, most of the 
assets of the non-nuclear electric system were transferred to the joint-stock enterprise, 
Unified Electric Systems of Russia (UES). The same thing happened in gas and oil. Gaz-
prom is a joint-stock enterprise that owns the majority of the Russian gas reserves and the 
gas pipeline system. These joint-stock companies are chartered corporate entities and al-
though the federal government stills holds a large interest, individual claims exist that are 
publicly traded, and there is some foreign investment and ownership. 
Even the nuclear sector has had some privatization and more is expected. Some 
units of Minatom have been made joint-stock enterprises. In some cases, the stock is 100 
percent owned by Minatom, but in others, some portion of the shares are privately held. 
While these shares are not publicly traded and currently there is no foreign ownership, 
some units have become accounting centers where private individuals have claims to the 
cash flows. Moreover, it seems clear that Minatom is positioning itself for privatization 
efforts that will include direct foreign investment in some of its business ventures. 
The fortunes of Minatom are clearly linked to both the privatization efforts in the 
rest of the energy sector and to reforms within Minatom. It is reasonable to expect the 
actions and behavior of these entities to be dependent on their organizational structure, 
especially to the extent that there is explicit potential for economic gains and losses to 
private individuals. 
The fortunes of Minatom are not certain. There is no guarantee of fiscal stability 
for this ministry in the face of reform and restructuring in the electric and gas industries. 
There is a basic instability in the energy sector as a result of competitive restructuring 
that can cause Minatom to either profit wildly or to verge on financial catastrophe. Priva-
tization of Minatom will heighten this effect, and in the event of financial distress, priva-
tization will undoubtedly induce more reckless behavior both financially and in the con-
trol of nuclear material.1 
1 In financial economic terms, privatization will lever the claims of the shareholders and create a 
bet-the-ranch incentive in the event of financial distress. 
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A. An Example of the Issues 
The economics of nuclear-powered electric generation highlights our research. 
Minatom has set a course towards the promotion of nuclear power both within Russia and 
internationally. The plan is elaborate and extensive as discussed in detail in the next sec-
tion. Even so, there is a fundamental question of its viability. Is nuclear power economi-
cally efficient? Will Russia be able to make a profit from building nuclear plants in other 
countries? Are new technologies in nuclear power generation and fuel processing eco-
nomically viable? Could reform of the gas industry cause nuclear power to fail the market 
test in the face of cheaper natural-gas combined-cycle turbine power plants? How will 
reform in the electric industry affect cash flows and investment in nuclear power? 
At bottom, the answers to these questions will impact the behavior of Minatom 
toward the United States and its nuclear nonproliferation initiatives. If Minatom founders 
on the rocks of market competition in its nuclear power expansion program, it will be 
much more sensitive to U.S. programs that channel hard cash to its departments and divi-
sions. On the other hand, if the nuclear power enterprises prosper, Minatom will be less 
dependent on the revenues flowing from U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs. Under-
standing the underlying economics of restructuring and privatization at Minatom will 
help assess the cost effectiveness of the many nuclear nonproliferation initiatives. 
B. Issues in Privatization 
Privatization of the Russian nuclear sector poses a number of questions and con-
cerns from the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation. Some are obvious: If privatization 
takes the form of numerous semi-autonomous departments organized as joint stock enter-
prises (enterprises with some private and some government ownership), the private own-
ers will have the incentive to breach control protocols on nuclear material in order to 
make a profit. The extent of this threat even now is unclear, but troublesome. 
However, there are other aspects of the problem that may be even more of a 
threat. The routine of privatization in Russia over the last decade is corruption and the 
stereotype is Gazprom. Gazprom is a joint stock company that owns the majority of the 
nation’s gas reserves and the transportation pipeline system. While government entities 
including the federal government own a substantial proportion of Gazprom stock, actual 
control of the company was captured by top management and through Byzantine business 
arrangements substantial wealth was transferred to private hands. Only this last summer 
was an attempt made to bring the financial dealing within Gazprom under control. 
Should privatization of the atomic energy industry follow the same pattern, si-
phoning of cash from atomic enterprises must spell potential disaster in the maintenance 
and control of nuclear material. Moreover, nuclear enterprises are a ripe fruit for corrup-
tion: Most nuclear enterprises have high front end investment costs where questionable 
procurement practices can be used to divert cash to insiders. And once in operation, nu-
clear facilities such as nuclear power plants have low operating costs allowing for cash to 
drain away without immediately upsetting production. 
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One of the most disquieting issues that has come to light in the privatization area 
is the change in ownership and control of the financial institutions that are closely aligned 
to Minatom. Until recently, Konversbank handled Minatom’s financial activities and was 
owned and controlled by Minatom. That has changed. Konversbank has been taken over 
by MDM-bank. Moreover, it is not completely clear who owns MDM. Some reports 
claim that it is owned by foreign-chartered stock companies controlled by powerful Rus-
sian businessmen and substantial foreign investment. Clearly, foreign involvement at any 
stage of decision-making and management control within Minatom or its financial agents 
increases the risk of nuclear proliferation. 
The nuclear industry is fundamentally different from oil and gas. The oil and gas 
industries are based largely on natural resource endowments that are valuable in the 
ground. Economists call their value “rents” because the income flow that they generate is 
not directly linked to production. No matter who gets this income, the value is still there, 
production still occurs, and consumers can enjoy the output of the industry. 
Nuclear production is not like this. The nuclear industry is a manufacturing in-
dustry. The natural resource value of nuclear products is small relative to the value added 
by processing. To be useful, natural uranium has to be enriched. For enriched uranium to 
be valuable in producing energy it has to be carefully handled and employed in a tech-
nologically sophisticated power plant. For the power plant to work efficiently, it must be 
constructed with precision and properly maintained. In this setting, the income flows 
from the output of the production activity must be plowed back into the production proc-
ess. There are few rents. Most of the money generated by nuclear enterprises must be 
spent on the real resource suppliers that join in the production process. Otherwise, pro-
duction stops, or worse yet, catastrophically malfunctions. This threat of corruption in the 
nuclear sector does not exist in natural resource industries. 
C. Objectives of the Research 
The rest of this document attempt to analyze the fundamental economics of the 
nuclear industry in Russia. Our basic conclusions are that the industry is in a financially 
precarious position. It is possible that the energy market place could shift in a way that 
makes nuclear energy a truly viable enterprise. However, it is at least as likely that the 
shift could go the other way. And either way, the nuclear business is not ever likely to be 
a money machine from which top managers and insiders can load their pockets. To the 
extent that privatization is potentially linked to corruption in the Russian nuclear sector, it 
is a very serious threat from a nuclear nonproliferation perspective and for the stability of 
the country in general. 
Russian leaders including President Vladimir Putin and Minatom chief Alexander 
Rumyantsev have repeatedly stated that the restructuring of Minatom is intended to make 
it attractive to foreign investors. Even so, privatization and foreign investment in the Rus-
sian nuclear sector is set against the backdrop of the fundamental economic enterprises of 
the nuclear ministry. Minatom is wagering its future on three basic non-defense business 
ventures––nuclear power production, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear fuel 
initiatives. Each of these are questionable in their own right and especially so in the light 
of the changing institutions in the Russian energy sector. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF MINATOM 
A. Organization of Minatom 
The industrial activities of Minatom can be classified into three broad areas: nu-
clear power, nuclear fuel, and weapons. 
· The Nuclear Power Complex is comprised of several departments that are coordinated directly by the 
Minister of Atomic Energy. Rosenergoatom and Nuclear Facilities Construction are the most im-
portant. Rosenergoatom coordinates the operation of the nuclear power plants (NPPs). 
· The Nuclear Fuel Complex includes the following programs: fuel for atomic power, NPPs nuclear fuel 
cycle development, promising technologies, high energy physics, controlled thermonuclear fusion 
and plasma physics, radiation safety, nuclear material production and utilization, nuclear fuel stor-
age and reprocessing services export development. 
· Nuclear Weapons Complex is responsible for development of the nuclear weapon complex, supervi-
sion of armament program, nuclear ammunition and disarmament, special nuclear and non nuclear 
materials, military nuclear installations, international cooperation in the military field, etc. 
Discussions of privatization of Minatom have centered on separating the Nuclear 
Weapons Complex from the other two. Two years ago, the former Minatom chief, 
Yevgeny Adamov, advanced a plan to transform Minatom into two entities. The cash 
generating entities, which are the power plants, power plant construction, and nuclear 
fuel reprocessing activities along with some other nuclear technology initiatives, would 
become a private corporation. National laboratories and defense facilities would form the 
Minatom “holding company” while all Minatom commercial business comprised in nu-
clear fuel complex and nuclear power complex would constitute a separate institution, 
called “Atomprom.” 
Adamov’s main objective was to gain a better control over financial flows of the 
commercial enterprises of the ministry, including the semi-independent generation con-
cern Rosenergoatom and to use part of the revenues from Atomprom in funding the nu-
clear weapon complex and research laboratories that were in financial distress. The pos-
sibility of transforming Atomprom in a private entity a later date was not excluded.2 The 
possibility gave rise to speculations regarding the status of nuclear power generation 
companies because current Russian law prohibits private ownership of nuclear power 
plants. 
Even after Adamov was replaced by new minister Rumyantsev his proposals were 
not entirely abandoned. In particular, the consolidation of the nuclear enterprises in one 
company was strongly advocated by Minatom officials during the discussion of the re-
form of power sector last year despite the opposition of UES. On September 10, 2001 
prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed a order by which Rosenergoatom is reorganized 
in a single nuclear business entity, and the plan is moving ahead.3 Also, President Putin 
2 VEK, No.30, July 28, August 30, 2000. 
3 The company will subordinate the nuclear power plants Balakovo, Beloyarsk, Bilibino, Kalinin, 
Kola, Kursk, Leningrad (currently managed by Minatom), Novovvoronetz, and Volgodonnsk (Rostov). The 
company will also incorporate the directorates of power plants construction and associated nuclear enter-
prises such as ATOMENERGOREMONT that produces equipment and spare plants for nuclear power 
plants, ATOMTECK ENERGO the provides research and technical safety assistance to Rosenergoatom, 
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has signed a decree providing for the integration of Russian nuclear fuel manufacturing 
and supply enterprises, in particular TVEL and Techsnabexport.4 The capital of TVEL 
will be increasing by issuing additional shares that will be bought by the Property Minis-
try. This procedure will “enhance the efficiency of the state regulation of Russian nuclear 
fuel cycle enterprises and increase in the competitiveness of nuclear fuel provided by 
TVEL on nuclear fuel market” according to a spokesman for Putin.5 
The three main revenue generating activities of Minatom are electricity genera-
tion, nuclear fuel processing and construction of nuclear power plants. Russia has con-
tracted to construct NPPs in several foreign countries. These include Iran, India, and 
China, in addition to the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. 
There is also the possibility of revitalizing joint construction ventures with North Korea. 
In the past, the U.S. has raised objections to the Russian construction projects in Iran, In-
dia, and North Korea because of nuclear proliferation concerns. Minatom has plans to 
build several new nuclear plants in Russia over the next several years. These efforts will 
focus on completing the projects that are underway. 
Russia is a major player in the nuclear fuel market. Russia enriches natural ura-
nium and re-processes spent fuel, and then sells this to nuclear power plants primarily in 
Europe. Russia is also engaged in a fuel processing agreement with the United States in 
which the U.S. buys Russian nuclear material that has been down-blended from weapons-
grade uranium to fuel-grade material. This agreement is called the HEU deal. The project 
has its own set of problems, but nonetheless it is on going and provides substantial reve-
nues to Minatom. From 1995 to 2000, Russia has received nearly $2 billion under the 
auspices of this agreement.6 The annual revenues generated from nuclear fuel sales in-
cluding the HEU deal are around $1 billion. 
Russia is also involved in several new nuclear fuel projects. Recently, national 
legislation was passed that paves the way for Russia to become an international center for 
storage of nuclear waste. Minatom claims that this project can produce substantial reve-
nues, which it might if it is able to resolve the nuclear proliferation concerns and receives 
the support of the U.S. Russia is also exploring technologies in reprocessing the pluto-
nium in spent nuclear fuel so that it can be reused as fuel in the form of mixed uranium 
and plutonium oxides (MOX). This would be sold in western Europe and potentially used 
in refitted eastern European and Russian power plants. All of these projects are in the 
early planning stages and it is not clear that any are truly commercially viable. 
The various activities of Minatom can be outlined in the following way: 
· Fuel Projects 
- Uranium Fuel Exports 
• Processed from Natural Uranium 
• Reprocessed from Spent Fuel 
• Down-blending from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU Agreement) 
- Plutonium Processing 
• Weapons-Grade Production 
VNIIAS, the research institute for nuclear plant operation. Power in Eastern Europe, 66, 17 September 
2001, page 16. See also, ITAR-TASS, November 11, 2001, BBC Monitoring. 
4 WNA news from NucNet Business News, 80/01, 11 September. 
5 Power in Eastern Europe, 66, 17 September 2001, page 16. 
6 From the GAO report on the HEU project, Table 1 and p. 13. 
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• MOX Reprocessing from Weapons-Grade Material 
• MOX Reprocessing from Spent Fuel 
• Plutonium Output from Breeder Reactors 
· Nuclear Generation Construction Projects 
- Plant Construction 
- Breeder Reactors 
• Larger Breeders that Start with Uranium 
• Breeders that Start with MOX 
- Use of MOX in Conventional Reactors 
• Conversion of VVER Reactors to MOX 
• Development of New Designs (GT-MHR) that Use MOX 
The outline highlights the interrelated nature of these fuel and construction proj-
ects. 
B. Strategic Goals & Budget Projections 
1. Strategic Goals 
Regardless of whether privatization of Minatom is expanded or contracted, the 
agency is locked in government policy debates concerning its own reform and that of the 
other players in the energy sector, UES and Gazprom. A synthesis of Minatom’s stated 
plan for the future and interviews with Atomic Energy Minister Rumyantsev give the 
following picture.7 The prime tasks are to: 
1) Secure the nuclear weapons complex and strengthen the country’s strate-
gic military potential. This implies increasing the state control over enter-
prises in Minatom complex.8 
a) Increase of state control in some joint stock enterprises. 
b) Consolidation of small enterprises. 
c) Transformation of some joint stock enterprises into state enter-
prises. 
2) Expand the role of nuclear energy in Russian energy strategy over the next 
20 years. 
a) Expand the share of nuclear energy in the domestic energy supply 
at expense of gas. 
b) Construct new nuclear generation facilities and recondition exist-
ing facilities in Russia 
c) Increase capacity utilization. 
d) Development of new nuclear power and fuel technologies. 
3) Expand construction of nuclear plants internationally. 
7 Strategy of Nuclear Development of Russia in the First Half of XXI Century prepared under the 
leadership of former Minister Adamov. 
8 This suggests that parts of the Minatom complex are out of control. Possibly, this is true and 
there is evidence; possibly, these statements are made to posture the Minatom leadership so that reforms 
can be undertaken with less political resistance. 
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There are also several reform issues: 
4) Restructuring Minatom and potential privatization of nuclear industry. 
5) Reform in the Russian energy sector and its impact on nuclear power gen-
eration and on generation and fuel initiatives. 
6) Nonproliferation initiatives and development of the industry. 
Minatom is pressing for reform in both the electric and gas industries. In particu-
lar it wants to see price reform in the regulated electricity and gas monopolies. Russian 
gas prices lie below those in Western Europe and those that Gazprom charges to its ex-
port consumers. Domestic gas tariffs are set at about one tenth of export prices and until 
recently only some 45 percent were paid in cash. The same distortions are encountered in 
electricity pricing. Industrial electricity tariffs are about one sixth of average rates in 
OECD countries. Residential rates, cross subsidized through higher industrial tariffs, are 
about 40 percent lower. 
Minatom’s proposal is for long-run reform of the energy sector so that it is made 
up of competitive markets with independent producers and non-discriminatory third party 
access to gas and electricity supply systems. This implies significantly reducing the cross 
subsidies implicit in the electric and gas prices. The recent legislative decree on electric 
industry restructuring mandates exactly this, but its implementation is potentially conten-
tious. 
2. Budget Projections 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of Minatom’s budget for 2001 and 2002, which high-
lights its various commercial activities.9 The categories are somewhat general. Figures 
are in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Fuel and construction projects are budgeted at $2.3 billion in 2001 and $2.5 bil-
lion in 2002. The construction projects in India and China were specifically funded out of 
the Russian Federation budget at $140 million per year. A breakdown of funds by type of 
activity is not available. Based on these numbers, fuel and construction activities account 
for around 55 percent of Minatom’s budget while electric generation makes up nearly 40 
percent. A major source of cash to Minatom is the HEU agreement with the U.S. There 
are a number of other fuel initiatives that are at various stages of development. Some of 
these involve development or redesign of nuclear generation facilities. 
9 This budget outline was obtained through personal correspondence with staff at the U.S. De-
partment of Energy. 
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Table 1: Budget for the Ministry of Atomic Energy 
Year: 2001 2002 
1. Electric energy production and selling 1 1570 1800 
2. External commercial activity 2 2200 2400 
3. Credits for NPP construction in India and China 3 140 140 
4. State budget funding 4 210 250 
5. Commercial activity of Minatom's entities and organizations 90 110 
at the internal market 
($US millions) TOTAL 4210 4700 
1 It is planned that actual payment for the produced and delivered electric energy in 2001 will constitute about 90 
percent (incl. 77 percent in cash) and 95 percent (90 percent in cash) in 2002. 
2 List of external commercial activity: Natural and enriched uranium; Uranium enrichment services and reproc-
essing (conversion) of triuranium octoxide into uranium hexaflouride; Recycled uranium enrichment services; 
Reenrichment services of uranium tails; Fuel deliveries for nuclear reactors; Irradiated nuclear fuel management 
services; Contaminated metals, metallic constructions and equipment reprocessing services; Services for devel-
opment and design of atomic reactor components and systems; Radioactive and stable isotopes; Ionizing radiation 
sources, labeled and deuterated compounds; Calcium metal, zirconium and other metals and alloys used in the 
atomic power industry; Charged particle accelerators, gammaradiation units; Special electronic and physical 
equipment and devices; Flaw detectors; Medical radiological equipment; Processing, laboratory and special pro-
tective equipment and instruments for the enterprises of the atomic industry; Construction of nuclear power plants 
in Iran. 
3 Funding from the RF State Budget. 
4 Includes nuclear weapons research, development and fabrication; fundamental research; target-oriented federal 
programs; and nuclear power plant construction in Russia. 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy 
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IV. COST ESTIMATES OF NUCLEAR POWER 
The first step in assessing the business fortunes of Minatom is an analysis of the 
economics of nuclear power. As shown in Table 1, electric generation sales make up 
nearly 40 percent of the Minatom’s budget. Moreover, a sizeable portion of the rest of the 
budget comes from the construction of nuclear power plants at home and internationally. 
As a consequence, an estimate of the cost of nuclear electric generation is essential. 
In this section we present preliminary estimates of the cost of nuclear power as 
well as the most competitive generation alternative––natural-gas-fired combined-cycle 
turbine generators. We focus on this comparison because these are likely to be the ulti-
mate investment alternatives for private foreign capital. 
Our estimates start with an OECD study that projected the cost of electricity gen-
eration using various technologies and factoring differing international conditions.10 The 
study is comprehensive and has been updated several times. We modify some of the as-
sumptions used by OECD based on data obtained from U.S. sources, and we cross-check 
the OECD assumptions from other international sources.11 Several of our estimates are 
corroborated by statement from Minatom officials. While our analysis is detailed, more 
extensive investigation of the cost of nuclear power is required before definitive conclu-
sions can be drawn. 
We give estimates of the cost of electricity generation broken into capital and op-
erating costs. The cost figures are expressed as cents per kilowatt hour. These are the tar-
iffs that the owner of a generator would need to receive over the life of the facility in or-
der to make the project a break-even venture at the start of construction. This is called 
“levelized cost” in the literature. Costs expressed in this way mean that we have calcu-
lated the wholesale price of electricity necessary to cover the construction and operating 
cost of a generator based on the expected life and annual output of that unit. 
Estimates both for Russia and the U.S. are presented for purposes of comparison. 
The estimates are given in U.S. currency denominations. 
A. Assumptions Underlying the Cost Estimates 
There are three assumptions that affect cost in a generic way. They are the dis-
count rate used to assess the project, the expected life of the generation facility, and load 
factor under which the generator will operate. The OECD study used two different dis-
count rates, 5 and 10 percent. We concentrate on the 10 percent discount rate, which we 
10 See OECD (1998). The data were obtained by circulating a questionnaire to OECD Member 
countries and non OECD participant countries through IAEA. “In addition to numerical data, the question-
naire sought qualitative information such as lists of elements included in the cost estimates and country 
specific accounting methodology that may impact cost and thereby explain significant differences among 
countries in the cost of generating electricity.” (p. 21) 
11 Until recently, data on the operation of electric generators in the U.S. was reported to the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission on what was known as Form 1. We have these data for the year 1996 
and use them to estimate the operation and maintenance cost of nuclear power plants in the U.S. Also we 
obtained data on the construction of new, non-regulated power plants in the U.S., called merchant plants, 
from the Center for Energy Studies at Louisiana State University. These data were used to corroborate the 
OECD estimates of the cost of new gas-fired combined-cycle turbine generators. 
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use for both the U.S. and Russian estimates. Certainly 5 percent is too low in the context 
of attracting private investment. 
We modified the operating life and load factor assumptions somewhat for each of 
the two different technologies. Based on our analysis of the U.S. data and discussion with 
U.S. electricity experts, we projected the useful life of natural gas turbines to be 25 years 
and the capacity utilization to be 75 percent. For nuclear units, based on the international 
experience, nuclear generators are being retired or substantially refitted after 30 years, on 
average. Also, based on the U.S. operating data, we estimated the capacity utilization of 
nuclear units to be 79 percent. In the U.S., the nuclear refuel cycle is longer than one 
year. Even so, we estimated that each unit is down about 10 percent of its fuel cycle for 
maintenance, repair, and refueling. When the unit is up and running, daily, weekly, and 
monthly consumption cycles cause it to run at less than full capacity. As a result, the ca-
pacity utilization when running is around 88 percent. Thus, the overall capacity utiliza-
tion is 79 percent. While Russian nuclear units in the past have not been achieving this 
level of capacity utilization when running, one of the goals of Rosenergoatom and Mina-
tom is to increase capacity utilization in this dimension.12 
1. Nuclear 
The typical construction cost for a nuclear unit is 5-9 years. At a 10 percent dis-
count rate, interest cost during construction represent 25-30 percent of the total construc-
tion cost of a nuclear unit.13 Decommissioning cost amounts to 2 percent of the cost. The 
cost of this operation are estimated at $105-370/kW in the OECD study. Particular to nu-
clear power plant construction cost structure is a high level of constant costs, independent 
of plant size or life of the plant, for the project implementation. The OECD cost study 
refers to activities such as site approval, information and public relations, training the op-
eration and maintenance personnel, licensing and activities of the supplier such as safety 
analysis, documentation and project management. These costs are about 30 percent of the 
total capital cost of a one unit nuclear power plant of 1200MW according to some 
sources.14 However, this percentage seems exaggerated based on U.S. experience. For the 
U.S. nuclear plants building and structure costs were 23 percent of the total and equip-
ment was 77 percent.15 Land costs were negligible. These costs include financing during 
construction. 
Construction cost is related with the number of units to be built on a site. “The 
cost reduction is calculated to be 10 percent for a site with two units and 20 percent for a 
12 In general, nuclear power, as expected, is more competitive at lower discount rates while low 
capital options such as gas-fired plants increase the competitiveness at higher discount rates. Capital inten-
sive options are more sensitive to load factor variation than low capital-intensive options. Generally in-
creases in lifetime decreases average levelized cost. However this may not be true if fuel prices are as-
sumed to increase rapidly in the long run. For gas fired power plants, capital share represents only a small 
share of levelized costs; therefore increasing lifetime has little influence on generation costs. Moreover if 
the prices are assume to increase significantly levelized cost increase when lifetime is extended. 
13 Bertel and Stevens (1998). 
14 Ferroni, Kirchhof, and Heredia, (1998). 
15 For plants in the lower 25 percentile of cost, which are mostly plants built before 1974, the 
equipment cost was 72 percent of the total. 
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site having 4 units provided that the construction interval is less than 2 years.”16 A similar 
phenomenon exists for scale effects in the size of the unit. The OECD nuclear power cost 
estimates are based on a generator size of 604 MW. The standard Russian unit is 1000 
MW. We use a 20 percent scale factor to project the OECD cost estimates to 1000 MW 
units. That is, we assume that there is a 20 percent cost saving as plant size increases. 
This is roughly based on the scale factors observed in U.S. construction costs across all 
types of generators. 
The main factors that influence operation and maintenance (O&M) costs are tech-
nical performance of the nuclear power plant, safety regulation and manpower costs pre-
vailing in different countries. O&M cost varies significantly from country to country. The 
reasons for this disparity have been analyzed in a NEA study (1995). The conclusion was 
that a large portion of the disparity is due to a lack of harmonized methodology for cal-
culating these costs.17 Safety regulations also have a substantial impact especially when 
safety regulations are in flux. Refueling outage is another key parameter. The average 
today is 50 days and “it keeps getting shorter.”18 Repair cost (not including manpower 
cost) seem to have a high share in the O&M cost. At least in Japan, from 1985 and 1995 
it comprised about 60 percent of the O&M.19 
In the OECD cost study there are several things covered in O&M for both the 
U.S. and Russia. These include operation, site monitoring, maintenance (materials, man-
power, services), engineering support staff, administration, operation waste management 
and disposal, safeguards. Items covered only in the U.S. estimates: general expenses of 
central services taxes & duties (plant specific) insurance (plant specific). Items in Russian 
estimates only: support to regulatory bodies. Major refurbishment is not included in either 
set of estimates. 
The front end of the fuel cycle cost is made of the costs of uranium mining and 
milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. Back-end of the fuel cycle cost in-
clude, storage, conditioning and disposal of spent fuel for open fuel cycle or reprocessing 
and disposal of high level waste for closed fuel cycle.20 The most important components 
of fuel costs are uranium, uranium enrichment and reprocessing. From 1984 to 1994 there 
was a 40 percent reduction in nuclear fuel cycle costs according to NEA estimates.21 Due 
to improved fuel performance and lower price of uranium and enrichment services en-
richment prices have decreased by 30 percent between 1985 and 1990 and the trend is 
expected to continue. Also “drastic uranium price increase does not appear very likely in 
the short term owning to the existing excess inventories of fissile materials.”22 The esti-
mated fuel cost according to the 1994 OECD/NEA study was 0.47¢/kWh. This was based 
on a cost of natural uranium of $50/kgU; conversion, $8/kgU; enrichment, $110/kgU; and 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Pryor (1998). 
19 Kunitake, Nagano and Suzuki (1998). 
20 In the closed fuel cycle case credits for recycled uranium and plutonium are deduced from over-
all fuel cycle cost. There are arguments that open fuel cycle is the most economic alternative for utilities, 
but it is more likely that MOX imposes even greater financial penalties on utilities due to safety restrictions 
on fuel burn-up. MOX limits the capacity at which plant can operate. 
21 Bertel and Stevens (1998). 
22 Id. 
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fuel fabrication, $275/kgU.23 The OECD 1998 annualized cost estimates for fuel cost for 
Russia was .485¢/kWh and 0.581¢/kWh for the U.S. Cost for interim fuel storage as well 
as the storage of conditioned low and medium waste is estimated to be $133/kW.24 Under 
different regulatory regimes the back-end costs can have a considerable influence on 
overall fuel cycle cost. 
In order to cross check the numbers in the OECD study, we estimated the opera-
tion and maintenance cost data for most of the nuclear power plants in the U.S. using the 
FERC Form 1 data for 1996. Our estimates of O&M costs were 41 percent higher than 
those of the OECD.25 We used our estimates in projecting the costs for the U.S. and also 
increased the projected operation and maintenance costs for Russian units by this same 
proportion.26 
The OECD study referenced the capital cost of nuclear plants in the U.S. Since 
there are currently no nuclear plants under construction in the U.S., nor plans for any in 
the immediate future, this number is largely moot. However, we did project the capital 
cost of nuclear plants to the present time based on the capital cost of the nuclear plants 
built in the U.S. between 1965 and 1972 which were in the lower 25 percentile of costs 
for all nuclear plants currently operating in the U.S. This number was considerably higher 
than the OECD estimate. Again this number has no direct impact on our analysis because 
nuclear power in not of immediate policy concern in the U.S. 
2. Natural Gas 
For combined-cycle natural gas units built in the U.S., we are able to independ-
ently corroborate the capital cost assumptions used in the OECD.27 The OECD estimate 
of capital cost for gas units for Russia is higher than that for the U.S., but this can be rea-
sonably explained based on the fact that the U.S. is the world leader in natural-gas turbine 
development and production. Nonetheless, it is also reasonable to expect that competition 
internationally is likely to push the capital cost of natural gas turbines in Russia down 
toward the cost in the U.S. 
The O&M estimates for gas turbines was cross checked against the FERC Form 1 
data for combined cycle turbines, regular turbines, and conventional boiler units. In 1996, 
there were not many combined-cycle units in operation in the U.S. reported as such on 
Form 1, but the cost data that is available is consistent with the assumptions of the OECD 
23 OECD/NEA, The Economics of Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Paris, France, 1994 cited by Ferroni, 
Kirchhof, and Heredia. This implies a burn rate of around 35,000 MW days per ton. 
24 Ferroni, Kirchhof and Heredia. 
25 Our estimates are consistent with the actual estimated average generation cost reported by the 
Nuclear Energy Institute for U.S. firm between 1998-2000. These range between 1.27 for the first cost 
quartile and 2.46 for the last cost quartile, in mills per kWh. These estimates are similar to ours. We ac-
count for load factor in estimating operating costs to make it applicable to the OECD levelized cost meth-
odology. Source: ‘www.nei.org/documents/Production_Cost_Quartiles.pdf’. 
26 The OECD study assumes that the Russian non-fuel O&M cost of a nuclear plant is the same as 
that of a gas turbine. In the U.S. based on utility reported data, we know that the nuclear O&M cost is over 
six times as large. Hence, some adjustment of the OECD assumptions is necessary for Russia. 
27 Based on data obtained from the Center for Energy Studies, Louisiana State University, for new 
merchant plants built in the last several years. 
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study.28 The reported O&M costs in the U.S., excluding fuel, were slightly lower than 
those reported in the OECD study. The OECD assumptions give higher Russian O&M 
costs for gas turbine units than U.S. The cause of this difference is not immediately obvi-
ous because we expect that labor costs are lower in Russia. However O&M costs are so 
low on these units that the issue is not crucial. 
For gas turbines, fuel is the largest cost share. The OECD study makes various as-
sumptions about fuel cost escalation over the life of the plant and discounts those changes 
back to the present. We modify this assumption. We make alternative assumptions about 
the cost of fuel and hold these constant over the life of the plant. This is the simplest way 
to consider alternative scenarios about the natural gas deregulation that is occurring in 
Russia. 
B. Cost Estimates 
The estimates are given in Table 2. A quick review shows that the lowest cost 
electricity is generated by natural gas turbines in the U.S.; these units have a levelized 
cost of 2.9¢/kWh. This projected cost for the U.S. is roughly consistent with historical 
experience over the last several years. The fuel cost for these plants accounts for ap-
proximately two-thirds of the unit cost of output. The U.S. fuel cost component is based 
on the November 2001 spot price for natural gas in the U.S. and the heat/energy conver-
sion factor (.55) for the turbine units currently being installed in the U.S. today.29 Table 3 
shows the effect on the fuel cost component due to changes in the price of fuel and the 
thermal efficiency of the turbine. Increasing thermal efficiency from 55 to 60 percent de-
creases the unit cost of electricity by $1.5/MWh. At the same time, if the price of natural 
gas were to stabilize at its highest level over 2001, the fuel cost of electricity generation 
would increase from 1.8¢/kWh to 5.7¢/kWh. If natural gas prices were to sustain at these 
levels in the U.S., nuclear power generation might reemerge as a power source. Indeed, 
when natural gas prices reached these levels during 2000, there was discussion of ex-
panding nuclear capacity in the U.S. 
In Russia, natural-gas electricity generation costs are estimated to be 4.2¢/kWh. 
The baseline case in Russia is built on the assumption that deregulation of the natural gas 
industry will drive up the domestic price of gas to equal the export price. The Energy In-
formation Administration reports that the export price of natural gas from Russia is ap-
proximately $4/Mcf.30 This compares to $3/Mcf currently in the U.S. The domestic price 
in Russia is one-tenth of the export price and it is this domestic price that domestic elec-
tric generators are now paying. However, deregulation of the natural gas industry is un-
folding and it will certainly drive up the price of gas, especially the gas prices paid by 
electric generators. In Table 2, we show a cost scenario where we assume that the price of 
gas only rises half way from its current domestic level to the current export level. This 
28 We compared combined-cycle units to other units in the U.S. based on capacity utilization and 
size. Turbines have relatively low O&M costs excluding fuel compared to conventional units. For the aver-
age size unit and at 75 percent capacity utilization, O&M cost is .2¢/kWh. This is about one-third of the 
same cost for a coal unit. 
29 Thermal efficiencies come from GE, the manufacturer of most commercial turbine generators in 
the U.S. 
30 Russia, Restructuring the Gas Sector, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html. 
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yields an electricity price of 3.2¢/kWh. Table 3 shows different scenarios concerning gas 
prices and thermal efficiencies. At the current natural gas prices and our guess about the 
thermal efficiency of the existing electricity generators in Russia, we estimate the fuel 
cost of electricity to be .4¢/kWh and the full O&M cost to be .82¢/kWh. 
The full cost of electricity generation from natural gas units is estimated to higher 
in Russia than it is in the U.S. Part of this difference is based on the cost of the turbines 
themselves. The OECD study assumes the cost of turbines to be 66 percent higher in 
Russia than the U.S. No doubt this difference existed in 1998 when the OECD study was 
last updated and may still exist; however, it will disappear over time. We can expect the 
price of turbines in Russia to fall toward the cost paid by electric generating companies in 
the U.S. This is especially true if Russia is able to attract foreign investment into the 
electricity generating industry. Table 2 also accounts for this scenario. If the price of tur-
bines falls in Russia to the U.S. level, the capital cost of gas-fired generation will decline 
from 1.4¢ to .9¢/kWh and the full cost from 4.2¢ to 3.7¢/kWh assuming that natural gas 
is priced at export levels. 
Next, consider the costs for nuclear power. We show estimates of the cost of nu-
clear power in the U.S. for comparison purposes only because there are no nuclear power 
plants currently under construction or in the planning stage in the U.S. Two different cost 
scenarios are given. In the baseline case, capital cost per kWh is the average cost experi-
enced by U.S. utilities in nuclear power plant construction between 1965 and 1974. It was 
after 1974 that regulatory delays began increasing construction costs dramatically. We 
inflated these historical capital cost numbers by the producer price index to 2001 dollars. 
Alternatively we use the capital cost assumptions adopted in the OECD study, which as-
sessed the capital cost of a nuclear plant in the U.S. to be lower than in Russia. O&M 
costs including fuel are based on data reported by U.S. utilities in the operation of nuclear 
plants in 1996.31 The projected total cost of nuclear power in the U.S. ranges between 
7.6¢ and 4.9¢/kWh. Even given the lower capital cost assumption, nuclear power falls far 
short of the economies of gas turbines, especially given current gas prices in the U.S. 
However, as noted above, if gas prices were to sustain at the highest levels reached in 
2000, nuclear power would become attractive. 
The projected cost of nuclear generation in Russia in the baseline case is 
4.8¢/kWh. We adopt the OECD assumption concerning capital and fuel cost. We increase 
the Russian nuclear O&M costs by the same proportion that the OECD understates U.S. 
nuclear O&M cost. This increases O&M from .45¢ to .58¢/kWh, which is still substan-
tially less than the U.S. and hardly a significant factor overall. 
The main cost of a nuclear plant is the construction costs. The OECD study places 
Russia slightly above average, world-wide in terms of the capital cost of nuclear plants. 
As shown in Table 3, the OECD estimate for the capital cost of a U.S. nuclear plant is 
$2064/kW; in Russia, it is $2448/kW.32 The main source of this difference is the interest 
cost during construction. For comparison purposes we estimate nuclear generation costs 
in Russia based on the OECD projected capital cost in the U.S. This low capital cost sce-
nario is 4.1¢/kWh. Also, the OECD estimate is based on a 604MW unit. We scale this 
31 Because the fuel cycle makes so much difference in the reported O&M cost, we econometrically 
took this into account based on the number of hours of the year the plant was down for maintenance. 
32 By comparison, the cost for a gas turbine in the U.S. is $510/kW. 
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estimate up to 1000MW, which is the size of the standard unit being built by Russia to-
day. This scale effect lowers the full, levelized cost of the unit over its life to 4.5¢/kWh. 
Table 2: Comparison of Power Plant Construction & Operating Costs (¢  /kWh) 
Assumptions 
Gas Nuclear 
Life 25 30 
Capacity Utilization 75 % 79 % 
Interest Rate 10 % 10 % 
Russia United States 
Combined-Cycle Natural Gas 
Capital Cost 1.42 .86 
Operation & Maintenance Cost excl. Fuel 0.42 0.20 
Fuel Cost 2.39 1.80 
TOTAL 4.23 2.86 
Low Capital Cost 3.66 
Low Fuel Cost 3.16 
Nuclear 
Capital Cost 3.75 5.71 
Operation & Maintenance Cost excl. Fuel 0.58 1.32 
Fuel Cost 0.49 0.58 
TOTAL 4.82 7.61 
Scale Effect 4.46 
Low Capital Cost 4.08 4.91 
Notes: All costs are cents per kilowatt hour. Estimates are based on adjustments to the OECD study of the 
cost of electric generation internationally. Capital cost per unit are the discounted cash flow over expected 
life and capacity utilization necessary to pay back construction, interest, contingency, and 
decommissioning expenditures. Natural gas fuel costs for gas turbines are based on thermal efficiency of 
.55, and gas prices of $2.9/MMBtu in the U.S. Gas price in baseline case in Russia is $4/MMBtu. 
C. Comparison Summary 
The cost estimates shown in Table 2 paint an interesting picture. By almost every 
measure, natural gas turbines are a more economical technology for electricity generation 
in Russia than nuclear power. In the baseline comparison, nuclear generation is over 10 
percent higher than the projected cost of gas generation in Russia. The same thing is true 
if we compare the low capital cost scenarios. In the low gas-cost case, gas turbines are 
substantially cheaper regardless of the capital cost of nuclear plants. 
The bottom line is simply this: Across a wide variety of assumptions it is obvious 
that nuclear power is not a clear winner in the horserace of economical efficiency in 
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs 
29 
¾
Maloney & Diaconu 
electricity generation. Indeed, it is very likely a loser and may be a distant second de-
pending on the wholesale price of natural gas. The only circumstance in which nuclear 
power turns out to be a lower cost alternative than gas turbines is if the interest rate at 
which the capital cost is discounted is set arbitrarily low. This circumstance is inconsis-
tent with the object of attracting private foreign investment into the nuclear sector. 
Table 3: Electric Generation Cost Major Underlying Assumptions 
Capital Cost Russia United States 
Combined-Cycle Natural Gas 
Base Construction $721/kW $422/kW 
Construction Interest, etc. $126/kW $45/kW 
TOTAL $847/kW $510/kW 
Nuclear 
Base Construction $1521/kW $1441/kW 
Construction Interest, etc. $927/kW $623/kW 
TOTAL $2448/kW $2064/kW 
Fuel Cost 
Natural Gas Price/Mcf @ = Electricity 
Thermal Fuel Cost 
Efficiency 
Russia: Export Price (2001) $3.96/Mcf 55% $23.88/MWh 
Domestic Price (2001) $.42/Mcf 55% $2.56/MWh 
35% $4.02/MWh 
United States Spot Price Nov 2001 $2.98/Mcf 55% $17.96/MWh 
60% $16.46/MWh 
High Price in 2000 $10/Mcf 55% $56.87/MWh 
Notes: Nuclear capital cost based on OECD assumptions. Other costs included in Construction Interest 
category are contingency (not part of cost for combined-cycle plants in Russia), major refurbishment (for 
U.S. only), and decommissioning. Conversions: $/MWh = 1000 ´ ¢/kWh; Btu/kWh = 3412; and there are 
1030 Btu’s per cubic foot of natural gas. Thermal efficiency is rate at which an electric generator converts 
fuel energy into electric energy. Scaling Russian nuclear capital costs from 604MW to 1000MW lowers 
the unit cost from $2448/kW to $2213/kW. 
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V. ECONOMICS OF MINATOM 
A. Electric Power 
1. Estimated generation costs 
Electric energy sales generate a large portion of Minatom’s budget¾over a third. 
Even so, nuclear generation is arguably a money-losing proposition. The current whole-
sale electricity price is approximately 1.1¢/kWh and was only .74¢/kWh in 2000. Esti-
mates shown in Table 2 and corroborated by statements from Rosenergoatom officials in-
dicate that the operation and maintenance cost of a nuclear power plant in Russia is 
around 1.1¢/kWh, of which fuel costs are about half.33 Based on this evidence nuclear 
power plants in Russia were losing money in 2000 and are just barely recovering the full 
O&M cost of production in 2001. 
Table 4 shows nuclear power generation for the last several years including the es-
timated amounts for 2001. The average electricity prices are also given. For 2000, the 
retail price of electricity nation-wide was 1.5¢/kWh; the average wholesale price was 
.74¢/kWh. For 2001, the projected electricity revenue from the U.S. DOE, which is $1.6 
billion, implies a wholesale electricity price of 1.1¢/kWh. This is in line with recent re-
ports that say “rates for Rosenergoatom electricity have risen by 54 percent in the first 
half of 2001.” 34 This gives a tariff of 1.14¢/kWh. 
Table 4: Tariffs & Minatom Estimated Revenues From Nuclear Power Generation 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Nuclear power generation (billions kWh) 111 129 137 -
Average retail price (¢/kWh) 9.6 1.3 1.48 -
Estimated revenues at the retail prices 1,065 1,671 2,055 -
Average wholesale price on FOREM 0.54 0.74 1.14* -
charged by nuclear generators (¢/kWh) 
Estimated revenues with wholesale prices 605 915 1,562 -
DOE Estimates 1,570 1,800 
Sources: EcoTass 26/2001,"Nuclear power plants to produce 137 bln kWh in 2001"; U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, private correspondence with authors, August 2001; UESR Annual report 2000, 
Section: Export of Electricity; Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, February 26, 2001; and FT 
Energy Online, Power in Eastern Europe "Lenergo receives rave Q1 reviews", 11/06/2001. 
* Based on reports for first half of 2001. 
Some supporting evidence is found in the following statements: “On 25 January, 
Deputy Atomic Minister Bulat Nigmatullin told Prime-TASS that the tariffs on electricity 
33 “At an AES, 1,000 kW/hr costs 352 rubles (R), and at a GRES [State Regional Electric Power 
Station]–an average of R366.” Rosenergoatom Executive Director Yuriy Yakovlev quoted in Moscow 
Kommersant in Russian 11 Sep 01 P4 by Irina Rybalchenko: "Rosenergoatom Gets Additional Powers". At 
an exchange rate of R29.5 to $1, this is the equivalent of 1.1¢/kWh. 
34 Novaya Gazeta, Energy and Metals Round Up, November 15 2001, (from FBIS). 
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generated by nuclear plants shall be raised 1.6 times because the tariffs do not cover a 
plants' basic costs.”35 Based on a tariff of 0.54¢/kWh this statement implies a tariff of 
1.4¢/kWh to cover the “basic costs”. Arthur Andersen in its April 2001 Russian Electric-
ity Sector Reform report about UES tariffs said, “Substantial increases in tariffs, 1.5x-
2.5x measured by actual exchange rates, will be required to make essential new, pri-
vately-financed investments economic” (p. 7). 
Given that the operating cost of Russia’s nuclear facilities is 1.1¢/kWh and the 
wholesale price was only .74¢/kWh in 2000, nuclear power lost money over the year. It 
appears that rates in 2001will turn out to be higher, but it is still clear that nuclear power 
is at best treading water in the ocean of electric generation. How can this be? How can 
the nuclear power plants not receive enough revenues to cover their costs or at best barely 
do so? 
Basically, the most likely explanation is that the energy sector has never really 
made the transition to a true market economy. Clearly since the currency crisis of 1998, 
the energy sector has been operating on a system of debit exchanges, with a large sprin-
kling of barter thrown in. This so-called non-payment problem pre-dated the currency 
crisis but itself became a crisis afterwards. The non-payment problem is beginning to re-
solve itself and this is moving along with restructuring of the wholesale electric market. 
In the height of the non-payment problem, it is likely that the costs of the nuclear 
plants that were not covered by revenues were simply washed through the rest of Mina-
tom’s budget. For instance, if the nuclear plants did not get paid for the power that they 
produced and sold to UES, then they did not have the currency to pay Minatom for the 
fuel that they used. Certainly, the fuel cost and probably a good bit of the other O&M 
costs of the nuclear facilities are goods and services supplied by Minatom. Hence, these 
intra-agency transfers are carried on the books without the exchange of actual cash. Mi-
natom supplies Rosenergoatom and takes what revenues for these services as it can get.36 
Another possible answer to the question of how can these shortfalls exists is that 
the facilities themselves are not being adequately maintained. This answer is much more 
disquieting than the first. Regrettably, there is some evidence that it is the case. Activists 
in favor of shutting down the Leningrad nuclear power plant cite evidence that there have 
been numerous safety violations there.37 
In any case, the implications are discouraging in terms of the economic vitality of 
Minatom. Even though electricity sales make up a large share of the overall Minatom 
budget, electricity is not a cash cow. Our conclusion is that unless reform in the electric-
ity market increases tariffs, nuclear power sales will not generate enough money into the 
future even to properly maintain the nuclear plants much less offer support to any of the 
other ventures of Minatom. 
35 RFE/RL( Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) News Line, Russia, 26 January 2000. 
36 One place to look to pursue this point further is the Leningrad Power Plant which was not part 
of Rosenergoatom in the past. A check of its accounting if available should reveal how these exchanges of 
materials and services were accomplished. 
37 Environmentalists Claim LAES Is Unsafe, By Galina Stolyarova, St. Petersburg Times, Aug 3, 
2001. 
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2. Increasing Revenues Through Exports 
One avenue to increase revenues may be international sales. Minatom is actively 
pressing to sell more electricity outside of Russia. It has been engaging a long-running 
battle with the electric grid operating company, UES, which also owns most of the con-
ventional generators in the country. UES is unwilling to allow Minatom to independently 
market power for two reasons. First, UES wants to have nuclear power capacity at its 
disposal in satisfying domestic demand. This is valuable because UES does not always 
pay 100 percent hard currency for the nuclear power that it takes. Second, to the extent 
that excess capacity exists inside Russia, UES would like to be able to sell this power in-
ternationally on its own account. 
For the most part the nuclear power plants supply power to grid which is con-
trolled by UES. UES buys this power from the plants and pays for it with some hard cur-
rency, some barter, and some promissory notes. The proportion of hard currency has been 
growing over the last few years, but Minatom still argues that UES pays it a smaller per-
centage of hard currency than UES collects from electricity consumers. It is true that the 
cash revenue has tripled since 1998 and up to 75 percent of electricity output is now paid 
for in cash. Even so, “the nuclear industry is insisting on 100 percent payment, just as 
UES ultimate customers are now paying in full for electricity they receive.” 
Furthermore, Rosenergoatom claims that UES owes it R12 billion (approximately 
$410 million) through 2000 plus at least R3 billion more in 2001. It was recently reported 
that Rosenergoatom would begin imposing restrictions on the supply of electricity to the 
UES.38 Restructuring and repayment of this debt is an important issue to Minatom. UES’s 
debt to Minatom accounts for approximately 10 percent of the total accounts payable of 
UES.39 In June 2001 the government announced that was preparing a debt restructuring 
agreement between UES and Rosenergoatom. The debt would be restructured over a pe-
riod of 4 years. Renaissance Capital Investment fund speculated that “the terms are likely 
to be favorable to UES, as government has traditionally sided with UES in past disputes 
between the company and Rosenergoatom.”40 However, the past may have less predictive 
power now as reforms continue to rock the energy sector. In the last few disputes, Ro-
senergoatom has fared well against UES. Recently, UES has promised Rosenergoatom 
that it will pay R8 billion by the end of the year.41 Rosenergoatom declared in October 
that it intended to sell R15 billion of the debt owed to it by UES.42 
One of the main reasons that Minatom is pushing for consolidation of the nuclear 
power plants into one more centrally controlled agency is the nonpayment issue. 
Another is to gain greater freedom in reaching outside markets by open access across the 
electricity grid. 
It was recently reported that Rosenergoatom plans to export electricity to Georgia, 
Finland and Ukraine.43 But UES is the administrator of the grid and has been granted by 
38 July 3, 2001, ITAR-TASS in Russian from FBIS. 
39 See UES Annual Report, Balance Sheet of RAO “UES of Russia” 
40 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, Monday, June 18 2001, “Government to restructure 
UESR debt.” 
41 Vedomosti, 13 November, cited by FBIS, Energy and Metals Roundup, November 13, YeES 
Promises To Repay Debts to Atomic Energy Ministry 
42 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, October 30, 2001. 
43 Interfax Daily Financial Report, July 4, 2001. 
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs 
33 
 
                                               
 
 
Maloney & Diaconu 
law the exclusivity of the electricity export contracts. It refused to provide Rosenergoa-
tom with transmission and dispatch services for the contract with Georgia. In response 
Rosenergoatom filled a complaint with the Anti-Monopoly Ministry. In August the Anti– 
Monopoly Ministry ruled that UES is guilty of violating anti–monopoly laws for the re-
fusal to honor Rosenergoatom contract. UES declared that it would appeal the decision at 
Moscow Arbitration Court. If arbitration court confirms Ministry of Monopoly ruling it 
means the UES monopoly over exports will be abolished. Rennaisance Capital analysts 
predict that UES will win.44 However, UES has since proposed to Rosenergoatom a 15-40 
percent shareholding in a joint electricity export operator suggesting that management at 
UES is not so sanguine.45 The proposal has been not received with too much enthusiam at 
Rosenergoatom. 
Nonetheless, Russian electricity exports are small and Rosenergoatom’s capacity 
to take away a significant share of them is considered by industry analyst limited due to 
“the lack of relationships abroad, general entry barriers for Russian electricity, and UES’s 
political connections both domestically and abroad.”46 
In the discussions on the industry restructuring UES and Minatom are at odds not 
only on the issues concerning non-payment and grid access but also on the structure of 
ownership of the Federal Network Company and of Trading System Operator (TSO). The 
TSO is to be established as a non-commercial entity, comprised of wholesale market par-
ticipants, in charge of conducting the operations in the wholesale market in the next 
years. UES claims it should have a 50 percent ownership in TSO. Rosenergoatom and the 
large industrial customers argue that n o market participant should have more than 25 
percent in TSO. UES argues that the Federal Network Company, the system operator and 
deficit energos should be represented in TSO supervisory board while Rosenergoatom 
argue that they should be excluded as they are controlled by UES and this will allow UES 
to maintain control over the financial operations of the wholesale market. The resolution 
seems to be that UES will have 50 percent ownership in the TSO until the end of 2002 
after which its shareholding will be reduced to 25 percent. 47 
Rosenergoatom concluded an export contract with the German company RWE to 
supply 900 million kilowatt hours to Georgia in July-December 2001. Similarly, it plans 
to sign a contract to supply electricity from Kola Nuclear Power plant to Finland. For this 
it will be necessary to increase the capacity of first and second power producing units at 
the plant from 400 to 500 MW. In a similar move, Rosenergoatom also plans to sign a 
contract to export electricity to Ukraine in volumes of 700 million kWh per month con-
tingent on the synchronization of the Russian and Ukrainian electric systems (which was 
done in August 2001). 
In spite of the recent reports about Rosenergoatom signing contracts for electric 
power supply to international customers, it is not clear that it will be able to conclude 
these contracts despite the recent ruling against UES of Anti Monopoly Ministry. It is 
44 Morning Monitor, November 1, 2001, page 1, “UESR, FEC Clash Over Electricity Exports.” 
45 Morning Monitor, November 13, 2001, page 9 “UESR, Rosenergoatom May Form Joint Export 
Operator.” 
46 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, September 19 2001, “UESR appeals Anti Monopoly 
Ministry ruling.” 
47 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, Monday, October 1, 2001, “UESR Approves TSO Role, 
Appoints New Deputy CEO” and Renaissance Capital, Research Note, November 2000, “UESR Board 
Meeting- Positive Results.” 
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possible that the political and institutional barriers that have stopped these initiatives in 
the past have been swept away in the electric industry restructuring decree, but it is not 
certain. 
Even if UES monopoly is ended and bilateral contracts are allowed it is still pos-
sible that these contracts will not generate a significant flow of revenues in the future be-
cause: 
a) “Expansion of Russian electricity exports to the CIS states is being held back by 
their limited effective demand, while exports to countries further afield are re-
stricted by transmission capability.”48 
b) Rosenergoatom lack contacts abroad and expertise in export of electricity. 
c) The export tariffs are only slightly above domestic prices and not all of the sales 
are paid for in cash. 
In order to have an idea over the potential exports market open to Rosenergoatom 
let us take a look at the Russian current export of electricity conducted through UES. In 
1999 and 2000 UES exported electricity in CIS to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Georgia and in several other states, mainly Turkey, Poland, Latvia, Poland and Finland. 
Table 5 shows the exports. 
Table 5: Export of Electricity from Russia 
1999 2000 
Energy Supplied Paid Energy Supplied Paid 
Millions Millions Total Currency Millions Millions Total Currency 
of kWh $US of kWh $US 
CIS 7989.6 165.1 203.2 19.8 8567.3 141.4 175.0 45.9 
Other 981.1 20.6 23.7 22.3 4481.8 70.9 69.8 69.3 
Total 8971.0 185.7 226.9 42.1 13049.1 212.3 244.8 115.2 
Source: UES Annual Report, 2000, Export of Electricity 
In 1999, UES generated 602.2 billion kWh and 622.8 billion kWh in 2000. The 
UES revenue from power generation was $7.5 billion in 2000. So exports accounted for 
about 0.2 of the total UES revenues. About 90 percent of the UES exports are in CIS 
states. All of them are heavily indebted to UES and several times the delivery of energy 
has been halted because of the non payments. This is shown in Table 6. 
However, these countries are important because through their grid transits the en-
ergy delivered to other states such as Turkey through Georgia, Ukraine to Central and 
Eastern Europe (in 2000 the countries signed an agreement concerning the coordination 
of export to Eastern and Central Europe), Belarus to Poland. Based on the export date 
offered by UES in the annual report, the average export tariff charged by UES for the 
electricity exports is calculated and shown in Table 7. The tariff can help us figure out the 
potential revenues that Rosenergoatom stands to gain from electricity exports. 
48 UES, Annual Report 2000, Export of Electricity. 
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Table 6: Indebtedness Of Neighboring States To Various 
Suppliers For Electricity ($US millions) 
Debt as of Debt as of 
Country: January 2000 January 2001 Difference 
Belarus 39.5 22.2 -17.3 
Georgia 46.4 46.5 +0.1 
Kazakhstan 413.5 414.3 +0.8 
Ukraine 83.8 54.7 -29.1 
Total 582.8 537.7 -45.5 
Source: UES Annual Report 2000, Exports to CIS states 
As can be seen in Table 7, the export tariffs that UES is receiving are higher than 
the domestic wholesale prices, but they are still well below the full cost of producing 
electricity. This means that these sales are not likely sales of firm power. In other words 
this is mostly off-peak power that the supplier can curtail as needs be. The buyers are 
using it as backup to their own power sources, and as a consequence it sells for less than 
the full cost of baseload power. 
Table 7: Export Tariffs ($/kWh)
 Country 1999 2000 
Kazakhstan 0.019 0.015 
Belarus 0.02 0.016 
Ukraine No delivery No delivery 
Georgia 0.018 0.017 
Turkey No delivery No delivery 
China - 0.018 
Latvia 0.019 0.023 
Finland 0.021 0.015 
Poland - 0.012 
Average 0.0194 0.0165 
Source: Calculated from data in UES Annual Report, 2000 
a) Conclusions about Exports 
The bottom line is that Minatom would like to gain more control over the disposi-
tion of nuclear power and do so in a way that will allow it to increase the cash flows from 
these assets. Nonetheless it faces significant political and technical barriers. Moreover, 
based on the export revenues that UES reports over the last two years, the revenues avail-
able in the export market are not in and of themselves sufficient to support expansion of 
nuclear generation capacity. 
The export market alone will not solve the problem of inadequate wholesale tar-
iffs. Foreign power sales imply that there is some excess capacity in the Russian system 
in some regions and at some times. Even so, it is not possible economically or politically 
and probably not feasible physically that the grid operator will allow electricity to flow to 
foreign countries if there are domestic power shortages that could be assuaged by this ca-
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pacity. Ultimately, the only solution to the problem is increased domestic prices. Possi-
bly, but not certainly, the evolving reform of the wholesale electric market will yield this 
result. 
3. Reform of the Electric Market 
On July 11, 2001, the federal government passed a decree on restructuring the 
electric energy sector.49 The decree is ambitious verging on heroic. It sets a time-table and 
steps to be taken in the reform. The time-table calls for competitive markets to be in place 
in three years. The objective is to bring competitive markets to all of the energy indus-
tries, electricity, gas, oil, and coal; to create an open financial environment that will en-
courage and foster private investment; and to revamp regulatory oversight by reducing 
the power of the local political fiefdoms. In fact, President Vladimir Putin is being 
blasted by political opponents for stripping local governments of power.50 Nonetheless, 
this is exactly what other commentators have argued is necessary to make the country 
attractive to foreign investors.51 
The goals or “keys to success” identified in the decree are many. The most nota-
ble are: creation of competitive electric power markets; creation of favorable conditions 
for new construction and operation of new capacity in generation and transmission of 
power; phasing out the cross subsidizing of various regions and groups of electric power 
consumers; creation of a support system for low-income population strata; and de-
monopolization of the fuel market for thermal power plants. These goals are notable not 
only because they are Herculean but also because some imply significant reform in other 
sectors of the economy. For instance, to say that the fuel industry will be “de-
monopolized” is to say that much the same reform proposed in the electric sector will be 
undertaken in the coal, oil, and gas industries. 
Of course, major reform of the private sector implies major reform of the public 
bodies overseeing the sector. The decree calls for the creation of a new system of regula-
tion to guide the industry under the new economic conditions. This means clarification of 
the status, jurisdiction and “order of business” of the various government entities with 
regulatory authority over the sector. 
a) Wholesale Price Increases 
As we have discussed above, wholesale rates are substantially below the full-cost 
recovery level. Wholesale rates need to go up five fold to put them in the range of our 
estimates of cost. This is a substantial increase. It will create a lot of shock waves 
49 Decree No 526 on reform of the electrical power industry. An unofficial translation is available 
at: ‘ues.elektra.ru/en/reform/show.cgi?110701post.htm’. 
50 Moscow, Aug 3, 2001, (Agence France Presse) “The leader of Russia's main opposition com-
munist party lashed out at the government Thursday.” 
51 Bureau of Economic Analysis Foundation, Moscow, Analytical Bulletin #17, 1999. This docu-
ment claims that the local governments offer little property right protection to foreign investors. A recent 
example from the news is the case of the bailout of the Gus-Khrustalny Quartz Glass Plant by the American 
Sawyer company. Sawyer claims to have put $7 million into the bankrupt plant; on August 1, 2001, a fed-
eral arbitration court upheld a lower court ruling that voided Sawyers contract and essentially expropriated 
its investment. 
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throughout the economy. It is not likely to happen quickly. In May 2001, the Minister of 
Economic Development and Trade, German Greff, announced that  electricity tariffs 
would only grow by 100 to 120 percent through 2004.52 
By and large the current level of wholesale prices is a result of the deep subsidies 
in the domestic gas market. Domestic gas prices are one-tenth of the export prices. Do-
mestic gas prices have been around $15 per 1000 cubic meters (103m3) while export 
prices range from $130-$150/103m3.53 Assuming that UES is paying the domestic price 
for gas for fuel at its power plants, the fuel cost of a conventional generator would be 
around .4¢/kWh. Adding in non-fuel O&M costs would give a variable cost of some-
where around the current wholesale price. 
Obviously, this situation cannot continue forever. The average, annual wholesale 
price of electricity must be high enough to support the construction of new generating 
units. The wholesale domestic price of natural gas is expected to increase based on the 
restructuring that is being undertaken in the gas industry. This will necessarily drive up 
the price of electricity. However, the wholesale electricity price must increase even more 
to account for the capital cost of new generation capacity. This margin is lacking in the 
current wholesale rates and it must begin to be recovered in the near future or the lights 
will begin to go out in Russia. 
Higher electricity prices will be good for the electric industry but they will impose 
pain on consumers, and cross subsidies that have existed in the past will be narrowed or 
erased. Reform and restructuring of the electric sector will undoubtedly run into trouble 
as the cross subsidies in rates are reduced and eliminated, but the nuclear power sector is 
least likely to be adversely affected by the social problems that could easily plague the 
rest of the reform in that sector. Since the nuclear power sector sells only wholesale 
power it will not be directly involved in these tariff reform squabbles. Nor is it likely to 
bear more than its pro-rata share of any life-line tax that is imposed to maintain some 
level of subsidy to selected customers. 
b) Distribution of Revenues 
The decree on restructuring of electric industry is very explicit in terms of the nu-
clear power plants. It says, “The reform process will … includ[e] reform of federal, state 
unitary nuclear power enterprises” and that this reform will take the form of establishing 
one generating company.54 Consolidating the control of the various nuclear power plants 
is something that Minatom has been promoting for several years. On September 10, 2001, 
the government issued such an order (Government Directive 1207-r) which was a major 
step toward implementing restructuring. The directive orders atomic power plants to be 
transformed into branches of the Unified Generating Company (EGK) Rosenergoatom as 
it will be called.55 
The directive creates a unified generating company in Rosenergoatom. This is 
specifically what atomic energy producers had insisted on. This will significantly 
52 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, May 22, 2001 citing an Interfax News from the May 21, 
2001. 
53 Op. cit., note 30. 
54 “Decree,” section II.2, paragraph 2, and section V, line i. 
55 Moscow Vedomosti in Russian 11 Sep 01 by Aleksey Nikolskiy: "Atomic Power Plants United.” 
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strengthen the positions of atomic power producers on the energy market. Until this or-
der, all atomic power plants were said to be financially independent and were subordinate 
to Rosenergoatom only in questions of security. The agency did not have any means of 
control over the plants. “A unified generating company, with a unified tariff, will make it 
possible to consolidate all financial currents within [Rosenergoatom].” However, sources 
in Minatom say that the coordination of legal questions may take up to 2 years.56 
In spite of this directive, it is not perfectly clear how Rosenergoatom will itself be 
organizationally positioned. Several possibilities present themselves: One is that a single 
nuclear generating company, call it Rosenergoatom, is formed and that this company is 
autonomous from Minatom. Another is that this company would be a subsidiary of Mi-
natom. A crucial issue is the control of the revenues flowing to the nuclear generating 
company from the soon-to-be competitive sales of electricity in the wholesale market.57 
The question remains of how much control Minatom will retain over the nuclear genera-
tion facilities as the electric industry restructuring unfolds. It is possible that under the 
power generation restructuring plan Rosenergoatom will end up completely independent 
of Minatom. 
Such an autonomous Rosenergoatom could conceivably have power over revenue 
flows that would reduce the discretion of Minatom even if Rosenergoatom were still 
forced to buy fuel and nuclear engineering services from Minatom. For instance, a finan-
cially autonomous Rosenergoatom could arguably change the rate at which the nuclear 
power plants are refueled. Extending the life of the fuel assemblies would reduce the cash 
flow to Minatom and could upset its plans for fuel reprocessing. Similarly, an autono-
mous Rosenergoatom could side-track some of Minatom’s planned technological changes 
in fuel processes, such as conversion of the VVER reactors to use MOX fuel. Further-
more, if Rosenergoatom is fiscally separate from Minatom, who would make decisions 
about investment in nuclear power plants? If Rosenergoatom is fiscally independent from 
Minatom, it is quite possibly that it will choose to refurbish existing plants as opposed to 
build new ones, even ones that are already partially constructed. 
However, it seems more likely that Minatom will be in direct control of the uni-
fied nuclear power concern. This is reinforced by statements from Rumyantsev: “We will 
be able to accumulate more funds for development, to enhance the safety of our plants, as 
well as to build new power generating units.”58 The claim by Minatom is that the unified 
nuclear generating company would concentrate the financial resources from the enter-
prises in its hands and also could help reduce the current production costs. Even so, it re-
56 Moscow Kommersant in Russian 11 Sep 01 P4 by Irina Rybalchenko: "Rosenergoatom Gets 
Additional Powers." The structure of Rosenergoatom includes the Balakov, Beloyarsk, Bilibin, Kalinin, 
Kolsk, Kursk, Leningrad, Novovoronezhsk and Smolensk AES, and the following managements, which are 
under construction: Voronezh Atomic Heat Supply Station, Kolsk AES, Novovoronezhsk AES-2, and 
Rostov, Kostroma, and Bashkir AES. Also included are Kurskturboatomenergoremont, State Production 
Enterprise "Sevatomremont," State Enterprise for Repair Service of Atomic Power Plants "Production As-
sociation Atomenergoremont," a firm for adjustment, operational development and organization of man-
agement of atomic power plants, "Atomtekhenergo, and the All-Russian Scientific-Research Institute on 
Operation of AES (VNIIAES). 
57 The electricity restructuring plan treats the nuclear plants like the other large plants on the sys-
tem. In the first phase, these plants will continue to be regulated and will receive regulated prices for their 
output. In the second phase, they will supply the wholesale market on a competitive basis, subject to over-
sight relative to the exercise of monopoly power. 
58 ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, 11 Nov 01, BBC Monitoring, World Reporter. 
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mains problematic whether even the cash flows to nuclear power plants enjoyed in a 
competitive wholesale electric market will be substantial enough in the long run to sup-
port reconditioning of old generators and construction of new ones. 
Underlying the public statements is the hope that as a unified enterprise, revenues 
from nuclear power can be increased. It is likely that as unitary enterprises, each nuclear 
power plant sells at a different tariff because their average costs are different. The hope is 
that the unified tariff Rosenergoatom will secure will be higher than the average of to-
day's tariffs. In the process of lumping together the cost estimates of all nuclear plants 
Rosenergoatom will have some margin to inflate costs more than individual power plants 
are able to secure. And the lobby to set a higher tariff is likely to be more effective. 
Part of the truth probably lies in the arguments proffered by Minatom. Some 
plants incur losses, some do not. Rosenergoatom will be able to shift revenues from 
plants that make some positive margins in order to cover some basic maintenance and 
investment expenditures at the others. This possibility is limited when plants are managed 
independently; plants that enjoy a positive net margin use this for their own needs. 
Also, before the reorganization each plant was a separate legal entity. After the 
reorganization they are not anymore. So all their contracts likely will be concluded in 
centralized fashion by Rosenergoatom. This, on one hand, will allow Rosenergoatom to 
have a better control over the revenues from electricity sales; (it is likely that some por-
tion of them were diverted inside each power plant possible to management, laborers, 
etc.). On the other hand, by this measure Minatom mainly prepares a strong future posi-
tion for nuclear generation in the liberalized market. Rosenergoatom is expected to be a 
big player able to influence the wholesale market. The whole strategy of massive invest-
ment in new generating capacity, despite the poor economics of nuclear generation, cor-
related with their dramatic efforts to increase the market share is oriented in this direc-
tion. Using its political lobby Minatom is trying to get big fast, before the market is liber-
alized, so it is able to exercise whatever market power it can muster to increase its reve-
nues. The claims of reorganization––better management, economies of scale, better in-
vestment decisions, better safety––are, in part, arguments used to win the political battle. 
B. Nuclear Power Plant Construction Domestic 
Nuclear power provides about 15 percent of Russia’s power today. Minatom 
hopes to expand this to 20 percent over the next 7 years. To do so, it anticipates building 
four more nuclear plants and refurbishing several of the existing reactors. However, un-
less the wholesale price of electricity increases significantly, construction of new facili-
ties will not be a profit-making venture. 
Based on the cost estimates presented in Table 2, natural gas electric generation is 
cheaper than nuclear power based on operating expenses and the full recovery of the 
capital cost of a new facility. The full-cost-recovery price for nuclear power is 4.8¢/kWh 
while natural-gas-fired generation costs 4.2¢/kWh. Is also important to note that the com-
parison is done at 10 percent discount rate. Renaissance capital analysts estimated that an 
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appropriate rate for Russia would be 25 percent.59 At a higher discount rate the competi-
tive edge of gas is even more apparent.
 Minatom has long argued that the most profitable strategy is to export natural gas 
to western Europe and produce electricity in Russia using nuclear fuel. Historically, natu-
ral gas sales to western Europe have been impeded by minimal pipeline capacity. Re-
cently, plans have been made to increase capacity in order to move natural gas westward. 
However, the estimates presented in Table 2 assume that gas is priced at the cur-
rent export level. Competition in the gas market and increased exports to western Europe 
can only cause this price to fall.60 Hence, the price comparison between gas and nuclear 
electric generation shown in Table 2 is the most favorable estimate for nuclear power. 
Based on this, it is reasonable to predict that the competitive wholesale price of electricity 
will not be high enough to justify the construction of a new, “green-field” nuclear power 
plant in Russia. 
While a completely new plant might not be economically justifiable, it is likely 
that the four commercial reactors under construction will be finished.61 A large part of 
their construction costs have already been expended, the marginal payoff from the money 
spent finishing them is high. Assuming that reform and competition does bring higher 
electricity prices, Minatom will gain some additional revenues by completing these 
plants. 
Consistent with this, in 2001, Minatom allocated $137.6 million for the comple-
tion and start up of Rostov-1 and for work at Rostov-2, $3.4 million for the completion of 
Kalinin-3, has also allocated $200 million for building other reactors over the next three 
years ($60 million in 2001, $100 million in 2002, $40 million in 2003). 
Similarly, increases in the wholesale electric price may afford revenues to allow 
for the refurbishment of the existing nuclear power plants. While the economics of re-
conditioning existing nuclear plants is idiosyncratic, as a general rule, reconditioning is 
likely to be cheaper than new construction. Minatom has spent $35 million to for a major 
back fitting of Leningrad-4 reactor.62 Projections have $14 million allocated in the Fed-
eral Budget in 2002 for operations to extend the operating lifetimes of Novovoronezh-3 
and -4. 
Regulatory agencies both within Russia as well as outside monitors will likely 
force expenditures to be made on the old NPPs or they will be forced to shut down. One 
environmental group has been set up specifically to scrutinize the Leningrad plant.63 This 
plant is scheduled for international inspection 2002 and there are some issues that must 
be addressed. Hence, if the Leningrad plant or any of the other older facilities are forced 
59 “Mosenergo: Solid Prospects Even Without Restructuring" AlfaBank, May 26, 2000, page 8. 
“We assume a discount rate of 25% in 2000. By 2009 we expect the risk of investing in Russia's stock mar-
ket to decline to a point where the appropriate blue chip discount rate returns to its 1997 level of 16%.” 
60 If the supply increases to western Europe, price must fall along the demand curve. 
61 It is estimated that Russia needed about $2.3 billion to complete the 4 units that are partially 
built. Minatom announced that it plans to spend $618.4 million by 2005 in modernizing and extending the 
service life of its first generation NPP. WNA news, from Xinhua/NewsEdge Corp, 26 May 2000. 
62 WNA news from NucNet News, 207/01, 3 July. 
63 Op. cit., note 37. 
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to close because of the expense of upgrading the facility it implies that few if any new 
nuclear construction will be initiated.64 
Finally, the new nuclear technologies that are in various stages of development 
including the BN-800 and BREST-1200 breeder reactors, conversion of the VVER reac-
tors to MOX fuel, and the GT-MHR, are all unlikely to move forward rapidly. Minatom 
announced in February that plans to construct the Beloyarsk-4 BN fast reactor will be 
“actively restarted” in 2001 and that around $21 million have been set aside to get the 
construction started.65 It also announced that it will allocate $17 million in 2002 for the 
construction of Volgodonsk-2.66 However, these sums are small relative to the cost of 
completing these projects. While there has been some interest expressed by the interna-
tional community, funds have flowed slowly and clearly the U.S. will be a major force in 
making anything happen. Any significant amount of funds that are generated within Rus-
sia or any private investment that ends up in the nuclear generating sector will almost 
certainly go to the more conventional projects. 
Minatom claims that Russia is making a structural shift towards nuclear power, 
and that the government is determined to promote nuclear power plants. 67 Recently Mi-
natom reported to the Duma that Russia will commission 10 nuclear units in the next 10 
years and another 6 in India, Iran and China. However, there are voices in the Russian 
government and Russian public opinion that have started to question the viability and 
cost competitiveness of nuclear power option. An audit at Rosenergoatom, recently made 
public, addressed the issue of economic soundness of nuclear energy. We are not aware 
of the audit conclusions but the Comptroller Office statements has confirmed our as-
sumptions that the cost estimates pushed by Rosenergoatom are unlikely to be sound.68 
The operations of nuclear plants are a spider web of barter arrangements and low liquid 
promissory notes. More, in a recent interview with Rosenergoatom President, Erik 
Pozdyshev, we admitted that under “normal cost assumptions” nuclear power cannot 
compete with gas.69 While Minatom strongly lobbies the government and regions to sup-
port nuclear power generation, is very likely, especially after the onset of the reform, 
utilities and UES will devote efforts to dispel Minatom claims regarding the alleged supe-
riority of nuclear power. 
Is interesting to see the investment in generating capacity of UES.70 In 2001, UES 
began pushing the so called “5000 MW” plan, 12 projects that it hopes to sell with help 
of PricewaterhouseCoopers to international investors. It will be interesting to follow how 
the plan unfolds. If international investors are reluctant to invest in new conventional ca-
pacities, which are almost certainly gas plants, how likely is they will put money in nu-
64 There is one mitigating factor in that the Leningrad plant is one of the old RBMK Chernobyl-
type reactors and its retirement might occur because of the major cost of changing this technology in order 
to improve the safety. 
65 WNA news from NucNet News, 47/01, 13 February. 
66 WNA news from NucNet News, 289/01, 3 October. 
67 Russian Nuclear Site, News, November 14, 2001. 
68 Moscow Gazeta in Russian, 14 Nov 01 [Interview with Mikhail Ivanovich Beskhmelnitsyn, 
auditor from Comptroller's Office, by Milana Davydova, personal correspondent; place and date not given: 
"We Plan To Audit YeES RAO in Earnest." From FBIS. 
69 Moscow Vremya MN in Russian 10 Oct 01, Interview with Rosenergoatom President Erik 
Pozdyshev by Mikhail Klasson: "Terrorists Will Not Blow Up a Nuclear Power Plants.” 
70 Moscow Interfax in English 19 Oct 01,”UES considers attracting investment to be priority,” In-
terfax Daily Business Report for 22 Oct 01. 
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clear power plants and what chances has Minatom to attract foreign investment in nuclear 
power generation? 
Also, in its attempt to secure more budgetary funds Minatom is playing a risky 
game. Minatom publicly asserts that it needs funds to increase the safety of the nuclear 
reactors. First it needs funds to repair and upgrade the old reactors to alleviate safety 
problems that are the result of design inadequacies. Second, in an attempt to take advan-
tage of the terrorist concerns in Russia it is trying to obtain funds to increase the anti-
terrorist protection of nuclear plants and sites. While the strategy may work in the short 
term it will result in increased the public opinion awareness of the safety and mainte-
nance problems of nuclear plants. 
There are good reasons to believe there are genuine concerns about the safety of 
the nuclear sites. A Russian magazine asserted that “Several sector officials propose 
leaving only the reactors as state property and ‘exchanging’ all the rest of the infrastruc-
ture for investment money. They believe that this is the only way that money can be 
found to improve the physical protection of nuclear facilities, since not one AES [nuclear 
electric power station] in Russia corresponds with the regulations.”71 Minatom chief , Al-
exander Rumyantsev was even considering a changing in the form of ownership of nu-
clear facilities to some form of mixed state and private ownership on the parts of the nu-
clear site that do not pose security threats. This is a remarkable development in the atti-
tude of Rumyantsev team toward privatization. Rumyantsev seemed to favor an increase 
in the control of the Ministry and state over the nuclear plants for economic and safety 
reasons and was reluctant to consider privatization schemes with respect to power plants. 
The new development suggests that if Minatom’s scramble for funds is not successful 
and it will reach a point where it considers the lacks of maintenance and refurbishment 
funds critical. 
C. Nuclear Power Plant Construction International 
Regardless of the economic efficiency of nuclear power in Russia, Minatom is 
actively promoting nuclear power plant construction internationally. Currently, there are 
Russian nuclear power construction projects underway in Iran, China, India. Additional 
projects are being considered in each of these countries. Also, Minatom is preparing to 
bid on a nuclear construction project in Finland where it will be competing against Ger-
many, France, Britain and Sweden. Construction projects in Kazakhstan and the Ukraine 
are also slated. 
Objectively, these projects must be viewed with a certain amount of skepticism. 
We have done a rough comparison of the estimated cost of nuclear facilities to the 
amounts that Minatom is reportedly receiving for these construction activities. By our 
estimates, the base construction cost in Russia of a VVER-1000 plant is $1.4 billion not 
counting the interest cost during construction. Adding in the interest cost and contingen-
cies during construction runs the price up to $2.2 billion at a 10 percent interest rate. 
Based on our calculations, in most cases it appears that the terms under which Russia has 
agreed to participate in the international construction projects offer at best slender profits. 
71 Moscow Vremya Novostey in Russian 12 Nov 01 Article by Nikolay Gorelov: "Nuclear Privati-
zation" [FBIS translated text]. 
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Our estimate of the cost per reactor is derived in the following way. Based on the 
OECD study, the Russian cost of a 604MW nuclear reactor is $1521/kW (shown in Table 
3). Scaling this to a 1000MW plant gives $1375/kW or $1.375 billion for the plant. The 
OECD estimate of interest during construction, decommissioning, and contingency costs 
add 61 percent to the actual construction cost. Interest alone adds 37 percent. This gives 
$2.2 billion for the total cost of a 1000MW plant at start up. The cost of two units con-
structed on the same site at the same time is estimated to reduce cost by 10 percent. 
We interpret actual construction cost to be the cost of buildings and equipment. 
We can roughly separate the cost of equipment and buildings based on data from the U.S. 
experience. The average equipment cost for U.S. plants was 77 percent of the total cost 
and buildings was 23 percent. Based on this, the equipment cost of a Russian 1000MW 
VVER reactor is around $1.06 billion. Financing on the equipment share of cost during 
construction would raise the total on the equipment to $1.44 billion. 
1. India 
In July 2000 Russia and India finally agreed on the terms for the construction of 
two 1000MW VVER reactors at Kudankulam nuclear power plant. The construction was 
estimated to cost India $3 billion. The initial agreement was signed in the 1980s. Con-
struction of Kudankulam-1 was scheduled to start in October 2001, and the reactor is 
scheduled to be commissioned in 2007. Kudankulam-2 is set to begin operating in 2008.72 
Russia will design the plant and supply 90 percent of the equipment and materials. Russia 
will build most of the reactors on credit, funds for construction being allocated to Mina-
tom from Federal Budget. The terms of credit are very favorable to India which raised 
numerous cries from critics of the project in Russia. The announced contract price is $2 
billion. 
It is very unlikely that the construction of the two reactors is a profitable venture 
for Minatom. It is not clear exactly what Russia is supplying, but the implication is that it 
is more than the nuclear reactor equipment. If Russia supplied only the equipment, our 
estimate of the cost would be around $2 billion not counting financing during construc-
tion. On the other hand, if Russia is supplying 90 percent of the total costs, this amounts 
to $2.23 billion not counting financing, which is above the contract price. Again, if the 
Russian government is carrying the construction financing it will run this project signifi-
cantly into the red from the Russian perspective. 
Rather than a profitable venture in its own right, likely this is a long term move by 
Russian Federation and Minatom to gain a foothold in the Indian nuclear market. India is 
considered by Russia a very important potential market for export of nuclear technology. 
India’s nuclear market has been forecasted at $30 billion in the long term. In 2000 presi-
dent Putin signed an agreement with Indian prime minister Vajpayaee to cooperate in nu-
clear research. Putin assert that this is only the beginning of Russian Indian nuclear coop-
eration. Nonetheless, Russia will have to raise the price of further work if it is to enjoy 
profits from its expedition into India. 
72 WNA news from Ux Weekly, 30 July 00. 
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2. China 
In 1999 Russia started the construction of the first two VVER-1000 reactors of 
the Jiangsu Tianwan nuclear power plant at Lianyungang in northeast China. They are 
schedule for commission in 2004 and 2005. Total cost of the reactors is expected to be 
$3.2 billion, financed by $1.3 billion in loans from the Russian government, $1 billion 
commercial loans, and $600 million loans from the China Development Bank.73 Russia 
will receive $2.4 billion for the two units.74 Russia is supplying the technology and the 
reactor itself. China is responsible for construction and installation. Russia is financing 
the $1.3 billion loan at 4 percent. 
In 2000 construction has begun at two other reactors on the site that are scheduled 
to be commissioned in 2005. China currently has another 6 reactors under construction 
totaling 4400 MW envisaged an ambitious nuclear development plan for 2001-2006 with 
several new reactors to be build. However, in 2000 China considered imposing a morato-
rium on reactor orders in its five-year plan because of a slowing economy and a lower 
than forecast increase in electricity demand.75 
In 1999 Russia and China also agreed to build a gas centrifugal uranium enrich-
ment plant in Shaanxi province in China and to cooperate in the development of new 
generation gas centrifuges.76 
Based on our estimates, Russia may be enjoying a modest profit on its construc-
tion activities in China. Assuming that it is only supplying equipment and that this costs 
$2.12 billion for the two units, the contract price affords some surplus to Russia. On the 
other hand, financing more than half of the contract price at 4 percent arguably erodes 
most or all of the surplus. For instance, the cost of lending China $1.3 billion at 4 percent 
for 10 years if the true cost of the money to Russia is 5 percent is the equivalent of giving 
China $110 million today. If the true cost of the money is 10 percent, it is like a $350 
million discount, which is more than the surplus on the contract price, and if the term of 
the loan is 20 years, the discount at 10 percent would be $520 million. Hence, even 
though the stated contract price seems attractive, the terms make it somewhat less so. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how the construction financing is being handled. If the Rus-
sian government is financing the cost of construction up to start up, the project cannot be 
profitable given the stated repayment terms. 
Again, it is likely that Minatom is trying to build market-share in a market that 
has a significant potential for development despite the recent slow down in China’s nu-
clear power program. Minatom has recently declared that it will bid on the construction 
of two additional reactors in China.77 The question remains whether Minatom can make a 
profit in this market in the long run. 
73 ENS NucNet news # 415/99, China Daily 21/10/99, Reuters 25/10/99. 
74 As reported by the Russian Nuclear News, http://www.nuclear.ru/eng/news/full/16.shtml. 
75 WNA news from FreshFUEL, 26 March 2001, p. 6. 
76 WNA news from NucNet News, 52/99, 28 January 2001. 
77 Russian nuclear site, News, 15 November 2001. 
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3. Iran 
In 1995 Russia and Iran signed a $800 million contract for the completion of a 
partially built Siemens 1000 MW nuclear reactor at Bushehr, Iran. In 2000 Russia began 
the construction of the reactor that was scheduled to be commissioned in 2002.78 The pos-
sibility of three new reactors to be built on the site for $3.5 billion has been discussed. 
Talks for at least another reactor are due to begin, according to a Minatom official, in De-
cember 2001. Russia is training Iranian specialist to operate the plant. Between Russia 
and Iran there also have been talks about developing together a uranium mine and an en-
richment facility. 
The originally announced contract price of $800 million for the reactor is below 
cost by our estimates. It is not clear if the fee escalated since it was originally announced 
in 1995. The prospect of building three additional units at this site for an additional cost 
of $3.5 billion is also below cost assuming that Russia is supplying all of the material and 
equipment. If this represents the contract price for the equipment alone it is closer to the 
cost recovery level, but only if Russia is paid up front rather than financing the project 
during construction. 
4. Other Potential Projects 
Besides India, China and Iran, Minatom tries to continue or expand its nuclear 
technology exports to the Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Peru, Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam. 
Russia and the Ukraine have agreed to cooperate on the completion of the 
Khmelnitski-2 and Rovno-4 nuclear power plants. Russia will supply equipment, materi-
als and a loan but the details of the contract are still being negotiated. The power plants 
are to be completed in 2-3 years at a cost of $ 600 million. Ukraine has also continued the 
talks with EBRD about a loan for the completion of the two units.79 Also, recently Mina-
tom announced that they intend to participate in an international bidding in 2002 to build 
a fifth nuclear power plant in Finland.80 "We stand a good chance to win," claims Viktor 
Kozlov, general director of Atomstroyexport. "We will face a tough competition from the 
world's leading atomic energy firms [but] [b]y the time of the bidding, the Chinese proj-
ect will nearly be completed, and Russia will take this opportunity to prove its ability to 
build highly technological nuclear power stations and supply competitive products to the 
world atomic energy market."81 
Minatom claims that “construction of nuclear power stations in Iran, China, India, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine will provide 42bn dollars in 2002-2005 and 24bn dollars in 
2006-2010.”82 These numbers seem wildly exaggerated given that only $5.2 billion worth 
of construction is currently under contract in Iran, China, and India. 
78 WNA news from Agence France Presse/Russia Today Online, 23 May 2000 and Reuters, 6 
September 1999. 
79 WNA news from NucNet Business News, 88, 8 October, 2001. 
80 Russian nuclear site, ‘www.nuclear.ru/eng/news/’, 19 November 2001. 
81 Id., 19 November 2001. “Russia plans to participate in an international bidding in 2002 to build 
fifth nuclear power plant in Finland.” 
82 Id., 28 November 2001. “Russia sees nuclear power as key to energy efficiency, according to 
the federal purpose-oriented programme adopted by the Government.” 
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D. Nuclear Fuel 
Minatom is engaged in a number of nuclear fuel projects. In addition it is explor-
ing the possibility of becoming a spent fuel repository for the world. Russia is a major 
world supplier of nuclear reactor fuel. Expansion of nuclear fuel projects is one of Mina-
tom’s strategic goals. 
Our estimates are that Russia currently sells over $1 billion worth of nuclear fuel 
per year. Part of this comes from enrichment of natural uranium and re-processing of 
spent fuel. Most of this material is sold in Europe. Another major part comes from a joint 
project with the U.S. called the HEU deal. 
The HEU deal is a project under which Russia down-blends highly enriched, 
weapons-grade uranium into nuclear fuel and then sells this to the U.S. The original terms 
of the deal called for payments of $12 billion over 20 years. Some $2 billion has been 
paid to date. However, given the current world price of nuclear fuel and the incentive 
structure of USEC, the U.S. agent in charge of the purchases, the terms of the payments 
are likely to move against Minatom. Nonetheless, the HEU project will remain a major 
source of hard currency. 
Nuclear fuel enrichment services are an important cash generating activity for 
Minatom. However, the expansion of fuel initiatives beyond the ones that are currently 
profitable is problematic. These new projects include MOX fuel fabrication, refitting 
VVER plants to burn MOX, and spent-fuel storage among others. Both the MOX fabri-
cation and refitting projects must be considered speculative because they are based on 
Russian technologies that are as yet unproven. This does not mean that the technologies 
are unlikely to perform, but it does mean that extensive and costly research must still be 
done before these projects can move to the implementation stage. Even then, several 
studies indicate that MOX is not economically efficient compared to enrichment of natu-
ral uranium, even including the savings in storage of nuclear wastes. Funds for the proj-
ects are not obviously available in Minatom’s budget and promises of international 
funding have not materialized. 
The spent-fuel project is somewhat further along. Testing of elements of the proc-
ess was completed at the Mayak facility in the summer of 2001. Even so, there are a 
number of hurdles left, including political pressure from grass-roots organizations 
throughout Russia that are opposed to turning Russia into a nuclear waste repository. It is 
worth noting that these groups have some legal forces on their side because Russian law 
prohibits the importation of nuclear waste for purposes of permanent storage. However, 
the slit in the tent through which the camel’s nose has appeared is the claim that spent 
fuel will be imported for re-processing purposes. Minatom claims that nuclear waste stor-
age could become a lucrative business venture, which may be true if the nuclear nonpro-
liferation issues are sufficiently discounted. 
1. Closed Fuel Cycle 
It has also been and continues to be committed to a so-called closed fuel cycle, 
which substantially expands Russia’s supply of nuclear material. 
The breeder reactor technology is an example of a closed fuel cycle. The breeder 
reactor actually produces more fuel than it uses to generate electricity. Russia has one 
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commercial breeder reactor in operation currently, a BN-600. Another way of closing the 
fuel cycle is to reprocess the spent fuel taken from nuclear generators. Nuclear generators 
running on conventional uranium fuel create spent fuel which contains both recoverable 
uranium and plutonium. 
In addition to augmenting the supply of nuclear fuel, breeder reactors can poten-
tially contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. Breeder reactors use up more weapons-grade 
plutonium than do conventional reactors using plutonium. Former Minister Adamov was 
committed to building the BN-800 and BREST-1200 reactors both of which have a high 
capacity to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. The new BN-800 under construction at 
Beloyarskaya is going to use MOX and there are plans to convert the BN-600 to MOX. 
New Minister Rumyantsev still supports the development of fast breeders but has decided 
to decrease the focus on this technology and to diversify the range of research activities 
funded. The west is also reluctant to support Russia in development of fast breeder tech-
nology in spite of the fact that it uses up more weapons-grade plutonium because the re-
actors create material that is itself close to weapons-grade. 
The alternative to breeders is converting weapons-grade plutonium into a MOX 
fuel that can be burned in a conventional reactor. In this sense, burning weapons-grade 
plutonium in Russian VVER-1000 reactors is seen as a more secure solution since those 
reactors “spoil” the plutonium irrevocably. However, VVER reactors need to be up-
graded before they can use plutonium fuel. There have been plans for undertaking such 
upgrades, but so far the closest that Russia has come to MOX fuel production and its use 
as fuel in a nuclear reactor was the conversion of 6kg of military-origin plutonium into 
30kg of MOX fuel which was used in the BOR-60 fast breeder research reactor at the Re-
search Institute of Atomic Reactors, Dimitrovgrad. The conversion of the VVERs to burn 
MOX is still an unproven though not necessarily an unlikely technology. 
Another reactor technology is also being studied but is still in the development 
stage. An international consortium formed by Russia (Minatom), USA (General Atom-
ics), France (Framatom) and Japan (Fuji Electric) is working on the plans of a modular 
high temperature helium cooled reactor with a gas turbine cycle (GT-MHR). Such a re-
actor possesses superior safety characteristics and also a high degree of burn-up of the 
initially loaded plutonium. Spent fuel will have a low concentration of Pu239 and can be 
buried without processing. 
Construction of a large MOX production facility is also in the preliminary stages, 
though there have been several intergovernmental agreements. The first was signed in 
June 1998 between the governments of Russia, Germany and France. Italy and Belgium 
have also joined in. The plan (known as DEMOX) calls for construction of a MOX fabri-
cation plant in Russia using some equipment from the Hanau plant in Germany but re-
cently the government announced that the plant will be simply decommissioned and that 
the export of the facility in Russia “is no longer feasible” in the “current political situa-
tion.”83 
83 WNA news, 31 October- November 6, from NucNet Background, 20/01. The agreement said 
that Russia could use German technologies to make the project cheaper. Russia “could move the MOX fuel 
plant that was built in the city of Hanau and is not being used to Russia”[…] But the government of Ger-
many was unable to give final consent. In addition according to information of Russian experts, many ele-
ments of the equipment were dismantled and used in other production facilities. And is impossible to manu-
facture copies of them.” “International Disagreements” Moscow Segodnya, 12 Jan 2001, from FBIS. 
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There are two agreements in place between Russia and the U.S. involving pluto-
nium. The first of them signed in July 1998 covers scientific and technical cooperation in 
handling plutonium extracted from nuclear military programs. The second was signed in 
September 2000 and concerns the utilization of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium as a 
fuel for existing atomic reactors and reactors that may be built in the future. The agree-
ment specifies that the 34 tons of Russian weapons-grade material will be irradiated as 
MOX fuel in existing nuclear reactors in Russia or other reactors agreed upon by both 
sides. However, the Bush administration seems to be about to abandon the plutonium 
down-blending project because of its cost. The Russian part of the project was expected 
to cost around $1.76 billion and was to be paid for by the U.S. and other developed 
countries, but no firm commitments were ever made. 
A significant portion of Russia’s nuclear development policy is aimed at devel-
oping a closed fuel cycle around plutonium and uranium recycling from spent fuel. The 
benefits of this technology are an increase in the useable energy resources, a decreased 
environmental impact, and a reduction in the accumulation of plutonium. However, most 
of the nuclear countries have abandoned the concept of a closed fuel cycle due to the poor 
economics of the project and the current oversupply of uranium. An OECD study in 1994 
estimated that the reprocessing option is twice as expensive as the direct disposal op-
tion.84 Moreover, an increase in large scale isotope separation activities poses questions 
regarding nuclear proliferation. 
While reprocessing of spent fuel seems unlikely to float on its own bottom profit-
wise, there is another element of the reprocessing equation that involves plutonium and 
may gain the economic support of the west including the U.S. One way of disposing of 
weapons-grade plutonium is by reprocessing it into a plutonium-uranium fuel mixture 
called MOX. 
According to a strategy laid out in 1998 by Minatom, weapons-grade plutonium 
no longer needed for defense purposes will be used exclusively in the form of fuel for 
power reactors. Minatom sees weapons-grade plutonium as an “immensely valuable en-
ergy raw material that will still prove useful to Russia when reserves of natural fuel are 
exhausted in the world.”85 Russia firmly refuses to consider the alternative of burying the 
weapons-grade plutonium as a way of reducing its stocks of military plutonium.86 
Russia claims to need $2 billion to convert the VVER-1000 reactors and build a 
plant to fabricate MOX. The U.S. has announced its willingness to contribute $200 mil-
lion. Also Britain, France, Italy and Germany have declared that they will financially 
support the program in the amount of $400 million. Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland 
have expressed willingness to contribute. As an alternative the west could provide $1 bil-
lion for the construction of the MOX fabrication facilities and Russia would raise the 
second billion for the VVER conversion by selling plutonium fuel to foreign nuclear 
plants. 
With the help of the U.S. and other developed countries, Russia may be able to 
acquire the industrial production of mix uranium plutonium fuel that it currently does not 
possess on one hand and meet its non-proliferation obligations on the other. However, 
none of the technologies are proven and all of the alternatives require a substantial com-
84 OECD/NEA The Economics of Nuclear Fuel, Paris: OECD,1994. 
85 “International Disagreements,” Moscow Segodnya, 12 Jan 2001, from FBIS. 
86 “Seeking the Holy Grail for Nuclear Power,” The Moscow Times, Feb.12, 2001, p. 12. 
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mitment of outside investment. Proposals for financing the scheme were expected to be 
presented at G-8 summit this summer, but there has been no report of Russian success on 
this matter. Depending on the disposition and magnitude of the net cash flows derived 
from nuclear generation, Russia will be more or less likely to come asking cap-in-hand 
for foreign assistance on these projects. 
The international context seems unfavorable nowadays to reprocessing. The fore-
casts of uranium shortage in the seventies have proved to be highly exaggerated. Price of 
uranium has plummeted in the late 90’s to ¼ o f its value in the early 80’s. “In these con-
ditions, the extra cost involved in reprocessing and manufacturing the MOX compared to 
the direct manufacture of new UOX fuel through the enrichment of natural uranium is not 
offset by the saving in natural uranium due to use of the uranium and by the saving re-
sulting form the reduction in the direct disposal of the ultimate waste. In other terms, this 
strategy represents for the electric utility an increase in the cost of producing the kilowatt-
hour, thus acting like a brake on their competitiveness, an aspect that is increasingly un-
favorable in a newly liberalized market.”87 
2. The HEU Deal 
HEU agreement, formally known as “The Agreement Between the Government of 
United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the 
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons,” was signed 
February 18, 1993.88 Russia agreed to sell 500 metric tons of HEU. The initial imple-
menting contract was signed by USEC and Tenex, acting as agents for the U.S. and Rus-
sia, respectively.89 The agreement is implemented through a commercial contract that is 
periodically renegotiated to determine the price that USEC will pay for the material. The 
current pricing provision of the contract expires at the end of 2001. From 1995 through 
October 2000, USEC received from Russia about 3,000 metric tons of LEU blended-
down from approximately 103 metric tons of HEU. USEC paid Tenex about $1.6 billion 
and the DOE paid an additional $300 million.90 
87 Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option, Jean Michel Charpin, Benjamin Dessus, 
Rene Pellat, Report to the Prime Minister, Paris, 2000 Commissariat General du Plan, p. 99. 
88 Most of the information in this section comes from two sources: “Nuclear Nonproliferation, Im-
plications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium,” Report to the Chairman, Committee 
on Commerce, House of Representatives, December 2000, United States General Accounting Office [from 
RANSAC web site], henceforth referred to as the GAO report; and “Uranium Blues,” Richard Falkenrath, 
Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 2000. 
89 USEC stands for the United States Enrichment Corporation. Years ago, the United States built 
three uranium enrichment plants to serve the military and later to produce uranium for the nuclear power 
industry. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 mandated the creation of a government owned corporation called 
the United States Enrichment Corporation. This corporation stated to operate the Energy Departments of 
the enrichment plants in Paducah, Kentucky, and of the Portsmouth plant, in Piketon, Ohio, in 1993. (The 
third one, at Oak Ridge Tennessee was shut down in the 80’s.) USEC was privatized in 1998; 100 million 
shares were offered to the public at $14.25. The stock price had fallen to $4.50 in 2000. (Falkenrath, page 
36.) USEC announced in June 2000 that because of a global over-capacity in uranium enrichment and 
lower demand in an increasingly competitive market it would cease enrichment operations at its Ports-
mouth facility in June 2001. In October 2000, DOE announced that it would spend some part of $630 mil-
lion to maintain the Portsmouth plan in “cold standby” for 5 years. (GAO, p. 5.) 
90 GAO, Table 1 and p. 13. 
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The interagency Enrichment Oversight Committee (EOC) conducts federal over-
sight of the implementation of the agreement and consists of representatives from various 
executive-branch departments, mainly DOE and the State Department. 
According to the contract, Tenex blends down a specified amount of HEU into 
LEU. The amounts of LEU delivered to USEC vary depending the concentration U-235 
in LEU required by USEC in response to customers’ requirements. Higher the concentra-
tion of U-235, less LEU can be produced from a given amount of HEU. 
The contract specified that Russia would be paid separately for the enrichment 
services and for feed. “This arrangement reflected the way nuclear reactor fuel markets 
worked in the past: nuclear power companies buy natural uranium feed from a mining 
company and ship it to an enrichment company, like USEC which holds the feed in trust 
and is paid only for enriching it.”91 The agreement said that U.S. would purchase at least 
10 metric tons of HEU annually from 1995 to 1999, and then 30 metric tons annually for 
the next 15 years of the deal. The commercial contract says USEC has the option to pur-
chase quantities up to these levels and that the price paid by USEC would be renegotiated 
every year. 
The contract was amended in 1995 and 1996 to allow Tenex to blend down more 
HEU annually (12 metric tons in 1996, 17 in 1997, 24 in 1998 and 30 in 1999, and 30 
from 2000 on). In the government-to-government agreement, the U.S. pledged to pay ap-
proximately $82 per SWU. USEC marginal cost of production was estimated to be 
around $60 per SWU. SWU stands for Separative Work Unit. Since the proportion of 
LEU to HEU varies, the amount of processing is measured in SWUs based on the amount 
of HEU handled.92 
When agreement was signed Russia was expected to receive about $12 billion 
form the HEU purchase, $8 billion for enrichment services and $4 billion for sale of natu-
ral uranium component. “The enrichment component typically represents about two 
thirds of the value of nuclear reactor fuel. The other third is the natural uranium feed” 
(i.e., uranium oxide).93 Those figures assumed a constant price over the life of the con-
tract. In practice, the prices have been renegotiated. The government-to-government 
agreement specified that the U.S. would pay $28.50 per kilogram of uranium feed 
shipped to America. However, the commercial contract specified that Russia would be 
paid for the feed when the material was “used or sold” by USEC and the price was to be 
renegotiated every year. As a result of the USEC privatization act in 1996 the “contract 
was amended so that USEC, upon receipt of the LEU would transfer the title of an 
amount of natural uranium equivalent to the natural uranium content of the LEU back to 
Tenex so that Russia could sell the material on the world uranium market.”94 Since March 
1999 natural uranium is physically transferred to Russia, at its expense. However Russia 
had difficulties in selling this material. “Under the USEC Privatization Act of 1996 a 
quota applies to the sale of natural uranium for consumption in United States. In addition 
material is subject to trade restrictions in the European Union.”9596 
91 Falkenrath, page 42. 
92 Falkenrath, page 42. 
93 Falkenrath, page 42. 
94 GAO, page 7. 
95 GAO, p. 12. 
96 The United States anti-dumping law has come into play in the HEU deal. In 1988 Soviet Union 
began to export uranium to the United States. This was a new source of uranium on the international mar-
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In addition Russia was unwilling to sell much of this material because the market 
price of uranium has been declining in recent years and “has fallen below a minimum 
selling price established by Russia.”97 In March 1999, Tenex on one side and Cameco 
(Canada), COGEMA (France) and NUKEM (Germany) on the other side agreed on a 
contract that “gave the companies an exclusive option to purchase the natural uranium 
component of the LEU deliveries provided that the market price for natural uranium 
component of the LEU deliveries was above a minimum price determined by Tenex.”98 
Allegedly, between 1995 and 1998 the USEC struggled over the contract trying to 
protect its commercial interests but “not antagonizing the United States government suf-
ficiently to jeopardize the last, most important step in privatization – the initial public of-
fering of stock in the corporation.”99 In 1996 USEC declined Russia’s offer to increase 
HEU sales in that year from 12 metric tons to 18. This caused strong public criticism and 
the future of USEC privatization was threatened. Under these circumstances USEC 
signed a five-year agreement with Russia in 1996 to pay the government-agreed price. 
Currently, USEC and Tenex are negotiating to determine the price USEC will pay 
for the enrichment component from 2002 to 2013.100 USEC has reached a tentative 
agreement with Tenex such that LEU from 30 metric tones of HEU (5.5 million SWU 
worth of enrichment services) will be delivered annually. USEC will pay Tenex for the 
enrichment services at a price that would be based on an agreed discount below “pub-
lished market prices”.101 This would mean substantial decline in the price that USEC is 
paying Tenex for enrichment services because under the existing contract market prices 
are 10 percent below what USEC pays. However, USEC resells the processed material to 
electric utilities mainly based on long term contracts that are priced on average higher 
than market price and the price paid to Tenex for enrichment services. According to the 
GAO report, USEC has been able to more than recoup its payments to Tenex from 
charges levied on domestic nuclear power generators. 
The consequence of the agreement will be that Russia will receive less than 12 
billions estimated initially. To partially compensate Russia for the loss in revenue USEC 
has tentatively agreed to purchase additional enrichment services form Tenex for uranium 
ket. Because of the increase in supply and some market manipulation, the price of natural uranium fell by 
half in 1991 that triggered the action of a coalition of domestic uranium mining companies to petition 
Commerce Department to investigate uranium imports from USSR. As a consequence Department of 
Commerce determined that the “fair” market value of URSS uranium was four times the world market 
prices. In 1992 Department of Commerce imposed an 115 percent import duty on uranium imports from the 
former Soviet Union. This also applied to any enrichment content of uranium. However it did not at that 
time apply to natural uranium component derived from weapons. In 1992 Department of Commerce, in 
response to lobby from domestic uranium industry, initiated a suspension agreement with Russian govern-
ment. U.S. anti-dumping laws allows Department of Commerce to suspend anti-dumping duties if the of-
fending importer agrees to regulate its sales. At this time, the restrictions were extended to the uranium 
from weapons material. This agreement is still in force although its provisions have been renegotiated sev-
eral times. Falkenrath, page 44. 
It is not clear how to interpret the assertion referring to European restrictions since there are no re-
strictions on sales of uranium in Europe. 
97 GAO, page 12. 
98 GAO, page 13. 
99 Falkenrath, page 42. 
100 The new pricing agreement is likely to be signed by the end of 2001, WNA News 30 October-
November 6 from NucNet News, 335/01, 8 November. 
101 GAO, p. 14. 
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of non-weapons source. The natural uranium component will be delivered back to Russia 
as in the HEU agreement. It is estimated that “this arrangement is attractive to Russia be-
cause revenue resulting from sale of these additional enrichment services to USEC would 
go directly to Tenex rather than to Russia’s federal budget.”102 This provision raises the 
question of what will happen in the U.S. market for nuclear fuel and what will be the ef-
fect on the share price of USEC. 
Deliveries from June 1995 through October 2000 of over 3000 metric tons of 
LEU blended down from about 103 metric tons of HEU103 represented about one fifth of 
the total amount established in the agreement. Euratom Supply Agency reports deliveries 
through the end of 2000 were 111 metric tons of HEU. The GAO claims that the delays 
in shipment of low enriched uranium were caused, among other reasons, by Russian dis-
satisfaction with the level of revenue received and technical problems.104 The GAO says 
that “USEC has consistently paid Russia for deliveries of low enriched uranium and ac-
cepted shipments in a timely manner”105 estimating that USEC has “satisfactorily carried 
out its responsibilities as executive agent for the United States” despite the difficulties 
that occurred.
 A critical situation developed in 1999 when USEC warned that it would quit the 
contract unless United States paid the corporation $200 million claiming that the decline 
in market prices for enriched uranium was reducing its profit below the amount expected 
when it was privatized. DOE disputed the claim and USEC did not receive anything. 
USEC was not losing money on the HEU deal but it was not making as much profit as 
projected. More, some of its contracts were to be renegotiated in line with the new market 
prices. In December 1999 USEC decided to remain the executive agent but “USEC con-
tinues to face challenges in balancing its commercial objectives with the national security 
interests of United States.”106 
DOE and State Department officials agree that maintaining this balance is going 
to be a “challenge” given that USEC has stated that “its priority as a private company is 
to remain a profitable commercial enterprise and maintain maximum value for its share-
102 GAO, page 15. 
103 According to Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2000, page 10, “858 t LEU derived from 
30 t HEU were reported to be delivered in the USA in 2000, in line with the quantities foreseen under the 
Agreement bringing the total deliveries since the beginning of the programme in 1994 to 3,243 t LEU de-
rived from 111 HEU (out of 500 t HEU foreseen).” 
104 Due to the unwillingness and inability of Russia to sell the feed “Russia was not receiving the 
income that it expected to receive when the HEU agreement was signed and halted its deliveries of LEU to 
United States” in 1997 (GAO. p. 12). “In an effort to restart LEU deliveries, in October 1998 Congress 
approved $325 millions to be paid to Russia for 1997 and 1998 deliveries.” (GAO, p. 13.) The arrangement 
was that “DOE purchased 28 million pounds of natural uranium from 1997 and 1998 deliveries of LEU and 
agreed to keep this material and an additional 30 million pounds of DOE’s own uranium inventories off the 
market for 10 years to stabilize declining market prices.” (GAO, p. 13, note 10.) “The State Department 
and DOE officials … indicated that Russia’s continuing problems with receiving revenues from the sale of 
natural uranium component raises the possibility that Russia may again halt deliveries of LEU to the United 
States in an effort to recover its lost income. These officials reported that unless the international uranium 
market experiences a recovery and Russia is able to then sell the natural uranium component of the LEU 
delivered to USEC, Russia may once again approach the United States for compensation for unsold natural 
uranium.” (GAO, p. 14.) 
105 GAO, page 4. 
106 GAO, page 5. 
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holders.”107 However, USEC has ” agreed to provide DOE and the State Department with 
an annual report on corporation activities as executive agent and to notify DOE and the 
State Department of any activities or other information affecting USEC’s ability or 
Tenex’s ability to fulfill the implementing contract”108 
Half of USEC annual sales of low enriched uranium come from Russia and also 
almost 40 percent of total U.S. sales of nuclear fuel have Russian provenience therefore 
important issue raised by HEU deal is the impact of the agreement on the domestic nu-
clear fuel industry. 
The GAO report concluded that: 
“The HEU agreement’s implementation has had a beneficial impact on the national secu-
rity of United States, namely the removal of over 100 metric tones of weapon grade mate-
rial of over 100 metric tones weapon grade material from Russia. Achieving this benefit 
however, was not without cost. Not only has the U.S government spent $325 million in 
purchasing natural uranium from Russia, but the United States also faces a growing de-
pendence on Russian origin material for nuclear fuel” 109 
It suggested that EOC should examine the impact of the deal on U.S. industry and inves-
tigate the most effective way to maintain the U.S. mining, conversion and enrichment in-
dustry. Also the report recommended that, if the actions of USEC are contrary to US de-
fense interests, then the “U.S. government should be prepared to either replace it or take 
on the responsibilities itself” and that a “contingency plan” is needed that will “detail the 
circumstances under which USEC will be replaced … along with clear criteria for 
choosing the replacement”110 
From Russia’s perspective the deal generated 1.6 billion dollars of which two-
thirds went to Minatom and one-third to the federal treasury. Thirty percent of Minatom 
revenues from the deal (20 percent of the total) have been used to finance the conversion 
programs of Minatom. Most of the conversion program funding comes from this 
source.111 Some money is also provided by Russian government. 
3. Spent Fuel Storage 
Against a backdrop of public outcry not unlike reactions in the U.S., President 
Vladimir Putin signed a law in July, 2001, allowing Russia to import spent nuclear fuel. 
Critics claim that this will turn Russia into the world’s nuclear garbage dump, but Mina-
tom sees it as a potential profit opportunity. 
In August, the Mayak facility began carrying out the first test of a furnace for re-
cycling the waste. Spent fuel will be sent by armored train to the Mayak facility near 
Chelyabinsk in the Ural Mountains. The recycling process employed at the facility ex-
tracts useable nuclear material from spent nuclear fuel rods. The first tests were per-
107 GAO, page 17. 
108 GAO, page 5. 
109 GAO, page 27. 
110 GAO, page 27. 
111 “Helping Russia to Downsize its Nuclear Complex”, Report of an International Conference 
held at Princeton University, March 14-15, 2000, page 18, footnote 19 there is cited as a source for the split 
of revenue from HEU. It comes from an interview with Lev Ryabec, "We must save the best" from Gorod-
skoy Kuryer, (Sarov) March 5, 1998. 
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formed in August on a furnace used to turn the residual radioactive waste into glass and 
commercial operation of the third furnace for radioactive waste vitrification at the Mayak 
site was started in the fall 2001.112 
Spent fuel storage has problematic aspects. Turning Russia into a nuclear waste 
repository is not a politically popular. However, Minatom is trying to link the nuclear 
storage to fuel recycling and thereby mollifying the political opposition to some extent. 
Regardless of the popular displeasure with the idea, it does seem that this may be one of 
the most profitable ventures that Minatom can undertake, assuming that it gains the sup-
port of the United States. The project depends on Russia signing a peaceful cooperation 
nuclear agreement with U.S. The U.S. has consent rights over 90 percent of the fuel that 
can be imported, so commercial success depends on approval and support of the project 
by the U.S. 
112 Interfax and the Associated Press, Moscow, August 15, 2001; NucNet News, 330/01, 5 No-
vember. 




                                               
Maloney & Diaconu 
VI. PRIVATIZATION 
A. Attenuation of Property Rights in Russia 
The Russian experience over the last decade is a text-book study in the absence of 
property rights. Since the fall of communism the economy has been riddled with charges 
of corruption. The nature of this corruption has characteristically taken the form of asset 
shifting. 
After the fall of communism, joint stock companies (JSCs) were formed from 
formerly state-owned enterprises. The federal government retained shares in these JSCs, 
but control was passed to private individuals, who usually held shares in the enterprise. 
Some shares were sold to foreign entities. 
Gazprom is prototypical. This company owns most of the natural gas reserves in 
the country, and owns and controls the natural gas pipeline system. Gazprom is the larg-
est company in Russia. The government has 38.37 percent. Officially, foreign ownership 
is 11.5 percent, but the government says "gray schemes" have enabled foreign investors 
to acquire more than that, possibly already up to 20 percent. Germany's largest gas com-
pany, Ruhrgas, owns 5 percent. 
The following story recounts a case of asset shifting that is probably all too com-
monplace: 
Russia's main market watchdog said Wednesday that Gazprom managers did not 
violate the letter of the law when they sold shares in the gas giant on the cheap to compa-
nies run by their children and friends. The Federal Securities Commission said a 1994 
sale of 5 percent of Gazprom to Stroitransgaz for $2.5 million was legal. The value of the 
stake at the time has been estimated to be as much as $70 million, some 30 times more 
than was paid by Stroitransgaz, a pipeline builder.  The children of former Gazprom 
chiefs Viktor Chernomyrdin and Rem Vyakhirev, as well as former board member Arn-
golt Bekker and his daughter, control Stroitransgaz.113 
Asset-stripping creates an unattractive climate for foreign investors. Analysts at-
tribute to Gazprom's artificially low stock price to these fears. Gazprom’s current market 
capitalization is around $10 billion compared to an independent valuation of its hydro-
carbon reserves of more than $40 billion. 
This Gazprom story is not unique either for Gazprom or for the country.114 The 
case of the small American firm, Sawyer Corporation, shows how deeply the problem 
runs in the core of the society.115 
Sawyer signed a 25-year lease with the bankrupt Gus-Khrustalny plant in 1997 
under which it paid millions of dollars to cover the company's social debts and spent mil-
lions more putting its workshop No. 5 back into operation. Sawyer says it has sunk $7 
million into the Vladimir Region plant. But in May 2001, a Vladimir court found that 
113 Thursday, Aug. 30, 2001. Page 5, FSC Says Gazprom Deal 'Legal', By Kirill Koriukin, Staff 
Writer, Moscow Times. 
114 Wednesday, Aug. 1, 2001. Page 1, Gazprom Takes PwC Audit to Heart, By Anna Raff, Staff 
Writer, Moscow Times. “The audit … found numerous instances when Gazprom had transferred assets to 
Itera that cost it hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenues. 
115 #692, Friday, August 3, 2001, Business, After Ruling, U.S. Firm Says Will Continue With Ap-
peals, By Yevgenia Borisova, STAFF WRITER, STP, MOSCOW. 
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Sawyer's contract was void in a lawsuit initiated by creditor ROEL Consulting. The court 
also ordered that Sawyer be reimbursed $1.5 million for lost investment[.] [The appeals 
court ruled with the lower court in invalidating the contract. Furthermore, it canceled the 
$1.5 million reimbursement for inventories.] In early June, Sawyer representatives were 
barred from entering the plant's grounds. Sawyer accused Vladimir regional officials of 
masterminding the takeover[.] 
The 1992 law on bankruptcy is contradictory. As pointed out by a former head of 
the Russian Federal Securities Commission, the statute admits to a separation between 
the spirit and letter of the law. As a consequence, nearly anyone can gain legal standing 
and attempt to change the distribution of ownership claims to their favor through the 
courts.116 
In a study by the Russian Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), researchers re-
marked that the problem of attracting private foreign investment is that the big companies 
can negotiate the support of the government at the highest levels to protect their invest-
ment. This is not so for smaller companies. As the BEA study puts it: 
The third approach has been applied by all post-reform Russian governments with as-
tonishing consistence. They have declared support for foreign investors and the principle 
of national treatment, which is extremely important for creating a good image of the 
country as an investment host. In fact, however, paternalistic approach and benefits are 
extended only to large and/or internationally known, major leagues companies, while 
other investors are left out of the government supervision and have no appropriate legis-
lative support and assistance. Thus one has missed an opportunity to attract, on a large 
scale, medium-sized and small entrepreneurial capital, which is usually flexible and often 
technologically advanced.117 
Small and medium sized companies are the backbone of growth in a market econ-
omy. In Russia these are the companies most disenfranchised. The Russian experience 
points out exactly the prediction that can be used to measure the value of property rights 
institutions. 
Economic activity in a market based country is organized around firms. These 
business entities range from small sole proprietorships (mom & pop operations) to large 
multi-national conglomerates. In every market economy, most of the economic activity is 
concentrated in the large corporations even though most of the businesses are sole pro-
prietorships. Most firms start out because an entrepreneur has an idea about a new product, 
or a way to make things cheaper, or a better way of organization production. Some ventures 
are successful, some not. The ones that are not do not continue. The ones that are success-
116 The law says that a bankruptcy manager should draw up a plan for the distribution of assets 
which must then be approved by the creditors who may introduce changes in that plan. The law goes on to 
say that the bankruptcy manager should manage the debtor’s property. Local courts can whimsically inter-
pret anything that the manager does to potentially violate the right of creditors to approve the disposition of 
the assets, and apparently based on the Sawyer case, this can occur well after the fact. In the Sawyer case, 
ROEL was a creditor to the plant before its bankruptcy. The manager broke the plant into eight parts, but 
was only able to lease one unit, that to Sawyer. The attorney for ROEL admitted that his client had brought 
the lawsuit at the request of Vladimir officials. His opinion was that local officials were angered that they 
had lost valuable property to foreigners. However, as one plant worker noted, if it had not been for Sawyer, 
he would not have had a job. 
117 Bureau of Economic Analysis Foundation, Analytical Bulletin No. 17, September 1999, 
“Problems of Foreign Direct Investment Economic Policy”, p. 7. 
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ful have the singular characteristic: The business expands. Most often, business expansion 
requires that the entrepreneur accumulate additional resources. Sometimes the entrepre-
neur’s success allows the entrepreneur to expand using personal wealth. More often, how-
ever, the entrepreneur must raise financial capital from other investors. 
Property rights create a conduit by which small entrepreneurial ventures are trans-
formed into large, multinational corporations. Property rights are the institutional rubric 
under which private investors are willing to provide support to successful entrepreneurs 
in order to leverage this success. Where these property rights are absent, growth is 
stunted. 
B. Scandals Throughout the Energy Sector 
The most recent scandal at Gazprom is a good example of the kind of asset shift-
ing that has become the commonplace in the energy sector. The case involves the sale of 
assets to Itera, a competitor that appears to be owned by a holding company with a U.S. 
(Florida) corporate charter. In 1999, Gazprom sold a controlling stake in a natural gas 
producing company, Purgas, to Itera for $1300. Purgas now appears to be worth several 
hundred million dollars.118 
Similar stories are common throughout Russia. According to estimates by the 
Comptroller's Office the state lost 18.6 trillion rubles as the result of privatization of the 
oil enterprise, Sibneft. And more recently, shares in Sibneft fell 20 percent in an hour on 
news that the company had sold a 27 percent stake in the company back to Chukotka 
Governor Roman Abramovich only months after it had bought the stake from him. It ap-
pears that he was allowed to repurchase the stake at a “modest profit” to Sibneft so that 
he could participate, after the fact, in a substantial special dividend.119 
Transparency is a key issue in every discussion of privatization in Russia. The 
World Economic Forum ranked Russian companies on the basis of their “governance 
risk.” The rankings are shown in Table 8 below. Most of the panelists at the Russian Cor-
porate governance session at the 2001 meeting were investment bankers of Russian firms 
or international firms doing business in Russia. Generally, the feeling was that improve-
ments in corporate governance, which means more openness, would be forced on compa-
nies by the international investment community. The various panelist outlined their rec-
ommendations to Russian companies. The general theme is well summarized by the 
comment of William F. Browder, Managing Director, Hermitage Capital: “There is a 
need to stipulate an honesty policy for auditors and investment bankers that is fixed by 
large liability provisions.” The comment suggests that a substantial portion of the audit-
ing in Russian falls below the level of accuracy that we have come to expect in the U.S. 
118 This story is widely reported in the press. See, for example, Moscow Times, Wednesday, Aug. 
1, 2001. Page 1, Gazprom Takes PwC Audit to Heart, by Anna Raff, Staff Writer. 
119 Moscow Novaya Gazeta in Russian 13 May 01 Article by Roman Shleynov: "Pocket Waste"; 
Wednesday, Oct. 24, 2001. Page 5 “'Bandit' Sibneft Blasted for Sell-Off,” by Victoria Lavrentieva Staff 
Writer Moscow Times. 
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Table 8: Selected Firms' Size and Corporate Governance Risk Ranking 
Company Sales Net Profits Market Cap Risk 
Aeroflot 1521 44 320 Moderate 
AvtoVAZ 3241 42 200 High 
Gazprom 17980 3059 13068 High 
Golden Tel. 135 -13 314 Low 
LUKoil 15036 3049 10995 Moderate 
MGTS 259 11 601 Moderate 
Mosnenergo 1424 65 1111 Low 
Norislk Nickel 4379 1327 3390 Moderate 
Rostelecom 891 26 728 Low 
Sberbank 2838 321 723 Moderate 
Severstal 1589 110 907 Low 
UES 12481 234 4736 Low 
UHM (OMZ) 364 21 156 Low 
Vimpelcom 389 42 783 Low 
Yukos 6358 2186 8642 Moderate 
*All numbers in millions of US dollars. Market Cap is the market price of common stock times 
the number of shares outstanding. Source: World Economic Forum, 2001 
One interesting thing about the rankings shown above is that the electric and tele-
communications firms are ranked as low risks while the gas and oil companies are ranked 
as high risks. No doubt this has something to do with what we call the malleability of as-
sets. That is, the assets of gas and oil enterprises are more easily shifted than the assets of 
electricity and telecommunications. However, the predictions embodied in Table 8 may be 
misleading when applied to the nuclear sector. 
The nuclear industry is fundamentally different from oil and gas. The oil and gas 
industries are based largely on natural resource endowments that are valuable in the 
ground. Economists call their value “rents” because the income flow that they generate is 
not directly linked to production. No matter who gets this income, the value is still there, 
production still occurs, and consumers can enjoy the output of the industry. 
Nuclear production is not like this. The nuclear industry is a manufacturing in-
dustry. The natural resource value of nuclear products is small relative to the value added 
by processing. To be useful, natural uranium has to be enriched. For enriched uranium to 
be valuable in producing energy it has to be carefully handled and employed in a tech-
nologically sophisticated power plant. For the power plant to work efficiently, it must be 
constructed with precision and properly maintained. In this setting, the income flows 
from the output of the production activity must be plowed back into the production proc-
ess. There are few rents. Most of the money generated by nuclear enterprises must be 
spent on the real resource suppliers that join in the production process. Otherwise, pro-
duction stops, or worse yet, catastrophically malfunctions. This threat of corruption in the 
nuclear sector does not exist in natural resource industries. 
C. Privatization at Minatom 
One of the most disquieting issues that has come to light in the privatization area 
is the change in ownership and control of the financial institutions that are closely aligned 
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to Minatom. Until recently, the bank that handled Minatom’s financial activities was 
Konversbank and it was owned by Minatom. That has changed. Konversbank has been 
taken over by MDM-bank. Moreover, it is not completely clear who owns MDM. Some 
reports claim that it is owned by foreign-chartered stock companies that are most likely 
controlled by powerful Russian businessmen but that may also have substantial foreign 
investment. Clearly, foreign involvement at any stage of decision-making and manage-
ment control within Minatom or its financial agents raises questions of nuclear prolifera-
tion. 
It is interesting that the name, Abramovich, which shows up in the Sibneft scandal 
also shows up in the discussion of Minatom privatization. The claim is that the former 
Minatom chief, Adamov, was part of the Yeltsin power structure which included busi-
nessmen A. Mamut, R. Abramovich, and O. Deripaska. The Adamov plan to reorganize 
Minatom was seen as strategy to concentrate the most important and profitable subdivi-
sions of the sector¾atomic power generation, the production of TVEL’s fuel elements, 
and uranium processing¾under one single structure working in the interests of the Ma-
mut-Abramovich-Deripaska group. Professionals who were hindering implementation of 
the plan were said to be ruthlessly culled.120 
While this plan seemingly was sidetracked by the sacking of Adamov and the 
choice of his replacement from the top ranks of the professional nuclear scientists, it is 
not clear that the worm has turned. The primary vehicle that the Mamut-Abramovich-
Deripaska group was preparing as the engine of privatization in the Adamov regime was 
the MDM Bank and this bank has continued to gather control over Minatom business ac-
tivities. Since 1999, MDM Bank has been positioning itself to take over Konversbank. 
Konversbank is the financial institution that handles all of the international business 
dealings of Minatom including the lucrative HEU deal with the U.S. under which around 
$2 billion has been paid to Minatom for nuclear fuel processing. Until recently Konvers-
bank was 90 percent owned by Minatom through its subsidiaries such as TVEL and 
Tenex. However MDM attempted to take control through a complex and contentious new 
share issue. While the Minatom enterprises were able to stop this transfer in July, they 
seem to have lost control during an August 31st shareholder meeting, and it now appears 
that MDM Bank has control of 60 percent of the voting stock. 121 
Even though the financial restructuring of Konversbank and the corporate control 
transfer to MDM Bank does not in and of itself imply corruption, it is somewhat sinister. 
While corruption is not automatically implied by privatization, it is a troubling threat, and 
much more so in the nuclear industry than in oil and gas. 
120 Moscow Sovetskaya Rossiya in Russian 11 Aug 01 P 4, Article by Sergey Ignatov: "Order Is 
Being Established in the Atomic Energy Sector". 
121 Moscow Vedomosti in Russian 11 Sep 01 [Report by Svetlana Petrova: "Necessary Sharehold-
ers". See also Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian 29 Jun 01 P 4 Weekend Edition, report by Alek-
sandr Stepnov under the rubric "What They Are Writing About": "Big Game Hunting for the Atomic Bil-
lions". 
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1. Relationship to Rosenergoatom 
If Minatom is restructured in some way that makes it a publicly traded joint-stock 
company, presumably Rosenergoatom will not be part of this unless the law is changed to 
allow nuclear power plants to be privately held. Even so, a JSC Minatom could continue 
to oversee nuclear power generation. However, this would likely mean that it had less 
control over the cash flows and investment decisions. As a consequence, Minatom is less 
likely to pursue privatization in the large if it means giving up control of the nuclear gen-
eration cash flows. 
On the other hand, a case can be made that if the Russian federal government is 
sincerely interested in developing a viable and vibrant, competitive wholesale electric 
market, it would encourage the most active possible participation by the nuclear genera-
tion sector. Granting Minatom full control of Rosenergoatom and allowing for privatiza-
tion of Minatom with favorable status for foreign investors would arguably be the best 
way to further this cause. 
2. Other Privatization Issues 
Restructuring of the Minatom divisions is a point of continuing discussion. It ap-
pears that Tenex is currently structured as a JSC. It is a major player in the HEU deal. 
Several questions are posed: How is this affecting the HEU deal? Which other depart-
ments, divisions, agencies, etc., are involved in the HEU deal and which of them are 
JSCs? What are the other Minatom JSCs involved in? Can we observe a difference in the 
project development in those initiatives with JSCs versus those without? 
Minatom has announced plans to spin-off several properties and divisions over 
the next year to private investors. The announced list seems to include mostly non-
nuclear entities that have come under the control and ownership of Minatom for a variety 
of issues peripheral to its principal activities. 
On the other hand, the major move made by Putin this year is the announced plan 
to reintegrate subsidiary enterprises such as TVEL and Tenex. Whether this plan will in-
clude restructuring the major commercial components of Minatom into a joint-stock en-
terprise with private ownership, possibly foreign ownership of common stock claims is 
unclear. 
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VII. ISSUES OF CONTINUING INTEREST 
From the research and analysis presented above, we think that it is clear the Rus-
sia is in the midst of significant social and economic change. That such change will affect 
the projects and initiatives of the U.S. in regard to nuclear nonproliferation is almost cer-
tain. We think that the most obvious and timely question involves the restructuring of the 
electric industry and the control of the nuclear generating facilities. On this hinge swing 
the fortunes of Minatom. There are a number of other research questions in addition to 
this. Some specific ones are outlined below. 
1) Refine the estimates of the fundamental economic viability of the proposed 
nuclear power initiatives of Minatom as well as the other proposed commer-
cial projects such as fuel reprocessing. 
2) Monitoring the electricity industry restructuring initiative of the Russian fed-
eral government. There are three main issues: 
a) Control of Minatom over Rosenergoatom. 
b) Divestiture of UES. 
c) Tariff reform and wholesale market competition. 
3) Monitoring reform within Minatom as it involves privatization. There are a 
number of specific points of interest: 
a) Expansion or contraction of small joint-stock or semi-
privatized ventures associated with the agency. 
b) Investigation of the operation of small joint stock companies 
within Minatom. 
c) Monitoring of restructuring within Minatom as it will affect the 
disposition of scientists and other workers. 
d) Monitoring the financial affiliations between Minatom, 
Koversbank, Alfa Bank, and MDM Bank. 
4) Debt Restructuring. The nature of the restructured contracts and the legal en-
vironment and financial environment in which these transactions are under-
taken is a continuing interest. This is also linked to the monetary policy of the 
country. For instance, what is the frequency of debt contracting and recon-
tracting that is done in domestic currency versus U.S. dollars? A similar fi-
nance issue is raised in regard to the nuclear power plant construction projects 
between Russia and other countries. 
5) Monitoring reform at Gazprom. This includes: 
a) Development of the wholesale competitive gas market. 
b) Monitoring of startup companies and new capital projects in 
the gas and oil industry and the power industry that may well 
become competitors to Minatom’s nuclear power initiatives. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on our analysis, Russia’s nuclear sector is steaming into an uncertain eco-
nomic fog and very possibly toward the shoals of financial distress. We draw this conclu-
sion from our review of the restructuring of the Russian energy sector, restructuring 
within Minatom, and its own non-defense business enterprise initiatives: electricity gen-
eration, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear fuel processing. 
Reform of the energy sector may yield benefits for Minatom in the short run but 
will expose the nuclear sector to the harsh realities of competition in the long run. Hope-
fully, reform of the wholesale electricity market will result in cash flows sufficient to 
provide adequate maintenance so that the existing plants will continue to produce. How-
ever, it is possible that the cash flows will not be large enough to allow for major up-
grades in equipment. Considering both capital and operating costs, nuclear power does 
not look particularly attractive from an investment perspective compared to other energy 
options even if wholesale rates increase to cost-recovery levels. 
The fundamentals of nuclear power that confront Russia domestically are also at 
play internationally. Although Russia is engaged in several power plant construction 
projects, they are of dubious value. The terms under which these projects are engaged do 
not appear to be cost effective. It appears that Russia has agreed to build these facilities at 
a loss. Possibly this was done to pursue foreign policy objectives. Possibly, this was done 
to gain a presence in the international nuclear construction market. At all events, Mina-
tom will have to charge more in the future to make these ventures a commercial success. 
Finally, the nuclear fuel processing business is unlikely to generate as much revenue in 
the future as it has in the past. 
For all of these reasons, it is likely that the U.S. initiatives that provide Minatom 
with hard cash will have greater leverage over the next five to ten years. Because it is 
very likely that Minatom will not be able to raise significant funds from private investors 
and to the extent that privatization may have the all too common effect of diverting cash 
into private pockets, the money from U.S. sources with its attendant oversight furthers 
U.S. national security goals in two ways: It controls nuclear proliferation and it helps to 
stabilize the Russian economy through the nuclear sector, which comprises a substantial 
portion of the energy resources of the country. 
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IX. APPENDIX ON IMPORTANT ENTITIES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 
A. The Electric Industry 
The electric industry is an important piece of the puzzle in understanding the Rus-
sian nuclear sector. As noted above, electricity revenues constitute a substantial portion 
of Minatom’s budget and nuclear power plant construction and reconditioning within 
Russia is a major focus of Minatom’s plans for the future. Hence, an understanding of the 
electricity industry in Russia is warranted. 
1. Unified Energy Systems 
Until 1992 the electric power generation sector had been organized in vertically 
integrated companies, called energos, in each of the seventy-two oblasts under the super-
vision of the Ministry of Electric Energy. 
In 1992 the government started a mass privatization program restructured the en-
ergy sector. The government formed a new company, RAO EES Rossii (commonly re-
ferred to as Unified Energy Systems of Russia or UES) that replaced the former Ministry 
of Electric Energy. The government gave UES the ownership of the country’s largest hy-
dro and conventional thermal generating stations (but not the nuclear plants), the high 
voltage transmission network and the dispatch systems. UES was assigned the direct re-
sponsibility for transmission lines of 330KV and higher, substations and dispatch centers, 
fossil fired power stations over 1000MW of capacity and hydroelectric power plants with 
capacities greater than 300MV. The remaining generating capacity and distribution lines 
were assigned to regional energos, set up as separate joint stock companies. UES acted 
initially as a holding company for the Russian state, owning at least 49 percent in each of 
the 72 regional energos. Two energos have regained independence from UES and its 
share in four others has fallen below 49 percent, but its share in the rest ranges from 49 to 
100 percent. At the end of 1999 UES controlled 65 percent of Russia’s generating capac-
ity, nearly all of the high voltage transmission grid, and 58 percent of the country’s elec-
tricity distribution.122 UES owns the Central Dispatching Unit for the power grid. 
In 2000 the shareholder structure of UES was the following: Federal ownership 
52.2 percent, foreign legal entities 34.3 percent, Russian legal entities 5 percent, indi-
viduals 8.2 percent. UES shares are traded on the Moscow Inter Bank Currency Ex-
change, Moscow Stock Exchange, other exchanges of Russian Federation as well as on 
the over-the-counter market. Since 1998 UES has been participating in the Bank of New 
York program of issuing first level depository receipts against common shares. In 2000 
UES through Bank of New York started issuing first level depository receipts against pre-
ferred shares. 
UES is not managed as an integrated company, and it cannot fully influence the 
operations of regional energos. It receives little economic benefit from its stakes in the 
regional energos or from several of the federal level power plants. Divesting its stakes in 
122 “UES Electroshock Therapy?” Troika Dialog Research, September 13, 1999, p. 17. Troika 
Dialog (TD) is an investment bank offering investor news services. “An investment bank staffed by Rus-
sians, funded by domestic capital, and led by Russians.” See ‘www.troika.ru’. 
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regional energos was one of the conditions attached to the World Bank third structural 
adjustment loan to Russia (SAL-3). 
2. Rates & Rate Regulation 
A federal regulatory agency, the Federal Energy Commission (FEC), was estab-
lished in 1995, with a mandate to organize the wholesale market for electricity, regulate 
wholesale market tariffs for power and energy, and define procedures for tariff setting at 
the end-user level. The Commission also regulates the natural gas transmission and oil 
pipeline industry. The legislation also mandated the establishment of Regional Energy 
Commissions (RECs) to regulate tariffs for the sale of heat and power to customers in the 
energo service areas. 
The electricity market is composed of a wholesale and retail market. The whole-
sale market is supplied by the large electric generating plants plus regional energos that 
have surplus power. Buyers are energos whose load demand exceeds generation re-
sources and large industrial customers. The wholesale market is controlled by UES 
through its Central Dispatch Unit. UES receives subscription fees for grid usage paid by 
regional energos according to their regional electricity sales and by the other consumers 
with direct access to the wholesale market. 
Wholesale rates are regulated by the FEC. It appears that rates are paid to individ-
ual generators based on a kind of cost-based, rate-of-return formula. The FEC has pre-
scribed a kind of time-of-day pricing, but this does not seem to be fully implemented. It is 
generally held that the wholesale market does not operate on market based prices and this 
is one of the main points for reform. 
Since 1997 large corporate consumers have been allowed to buy power on the 
wholesale market through the Settlement Center of Central Dispatch Unit or through di-
rect contracts with generators to UES Independent Financial Operator.123 However not 
many companies have taken advantage of this opportunity because UES requires that at 
least 50 percent of the payment due to be paid in cash. According to a 1999 study about 
10 consumers bought electricity directly from the wholesale market attracted by the low 
cost of electricity under such contracts, which is about half of the average retail industrial 
tariffs. As the non-payment problem has been resolved, we expect that more large cus-
tomers are buying in the wholesale market. 
In practice, there is substantial flexibility at the regional level in determining the 
average tariff and allocating them among different categories of consumers. This is 
probably not substantially different from the practice of economic regulation in the U.S. 
except that the resulting tariffs are “determined by political reasons or allocation of lob-
bying forces between industry and power utilities in the respective commission, rather 
than by economic factors. Consequently, the ‘cost-plus’ mechanism does not secure 
guaranteed profit margins or break-even levels of revenue for the energos.”124 As a con-
sequence in 1998 FEC has set the upper and lower limits of retail tariffs for each region. 
In September 2001 Vladimir Putin signed a decree that establishes a single 
agency, Unified Tariff Agency (UTA), for regulating all natural monopoly tariffs. The 
agency will be formed on the basis of Federal Energy Commission and will set tariffs for 
123 Skate (2000) p. 6. 
124 Skate (2000) p. 7. 
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gas, electricity, pipelines, rail and natural monopoly telecom tariffs. The reason for 
bringing all state controlled tariffs under UTA umbrella is to assure a more coherent ap-
proach on tariff rebalancing given the interdependence between tariffs. According to the 
head of UTA, Georgy Kutovoy, from now on the tariff increases will be implemented 
only once a year. 
However, the decree has not dealt with the most acute problem regarding tariffs, 
which is the status of Regional Energy Commissions. These are still under the control of 
the regional governors because changing the way REC members are appointed requires 
changes in legislation. Ministry of trade and economic development is preparing a draft 
on Law on Electrical Utilities, that may bring some changes in this direction.125 
3. Challenges for Reform 
According to government estimates, 58 percent of existing Russian thermal power 
capacity, including both gas and coal fired units, was scheduled for retirement or reha-
bilitation by the year 2000.126 The power sector has been unable to finance the needed 
massive upgrade program. A lack of investment in new generation and distribution ca-
pacity means that Russia could face a power shortage within 5 years.127 Russian officials 
estimate that country will need $6 to $11 billion annually from 2000 to 2005 to carry 
maintenance and expansion plans, but UES has resources to invest only $1 billion per 
year. 
To attract foreign investments in the sector, reform of the electrical power indus-
try has become a priority. In 1999 the government assumed the obligation of reforming 
the industry in exchange for World Bank credits for the sector. 
The most acute problem was the establishment of principles and procedures for 
pricing of the electricity. Cross-subsidies impose artificially high costs on industry while 
subsidizing households. Reduction of non-payments and non-cash payments. In 1997 the 
list of strategic customers (customers who cannot be disconnected in the case of non-
payment) was significantly reduced. 
In 1999 cash collection rates stood at less than 20 percent.128 However, UES re-
vealed recently that in 2000 “in cash” payments to UES companies for heat and electric-
ity accounted for over 80 percent. This is an impressive improvement in collections. 
Moreover, in 2000 some of the consumers managed to pay some the debts accumulated 
over the preceding years.129 Payment collection in cash by UES has been improving from 
19 percent in December 1998 to 74 percent in July 2000 with barter in significant decline. 
Over the first four months of 2001, the cash payment percentage was 94 percent. Profits 
in the first quarter of 2001 were triple what they were over the same period a year earlier. 
UES chief Anatoly Chubais pointed out in the 2001 stockholder meeting that that 
in 1998 UES paid 27 percent in cash to Gazprom. Last year it was 92 percent, and this 
year it hit 100 percent. Coal companies, which formerly received 16 percent in cash, now 
125 Power in Eastern Europe 66, 17 September 2001, page 15-16 
126 FBIS from Moscow Novyye Izvestiya, April 28 2001, “Anatoly Chubais not Ashamed of His 
Work,” p. 1. 
127 Energy Information Administration, “Russia,” December 2000. 
128 EBRD, Strategy for Russian Federation, 2000. 
129 Izvestiya, op. cit., note 126. 
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receive 100 percent in cash payments. Oil companies used to get 13 percent in cash will 
now not sign contracts without 100 percent cash prepayments. Even so, the payments 
from UES to Minatom have not reached this level in spite of the protests of Minatom. 
4. Proposed Reform 
The planned reform set out in the recent government decree on electric industry 
restructuring is broad and sweeping. Some of the principal features are: partitioning of 
the electric sector into separate generation, transmission, and distribution companies; 
competitive markets; open access; transparency of both public and private enterprises in 
the industry; and protection of shareholder interests. 
Mandatory separation of the functional elements of the industry will require that 
UES divest its assets into two or more separate companies. In order to protect the current 
UES shareholder interests, the plan calls for each UES share to be traded in for a share in 
each of the spin-off companies. Indeed, if such a plan is carried out, the divestiture itself 
will have no direct impact on existing UES shareholders. However, it remains to be seen 
if disintegrated electricity industry can operate as profitably as can a vertically integrated 
enterprise. 
An intriguing feature of the plan is to create a fully federally owned grid company 
and dispatching entity. In the beginning, these companies will be spin-offs of UES. How-
ever, as the system develops, the federal ownership in the other parts of the dissolved 
UES will be divested and these shares will be traded for the privately held shares of the 
grid and dispatching companies. It is anticipated that this will be accomplished by March 
2004. In this process, the current non-government UES shareholders will essentially re-
ceive full ownership of the existing UES power generating establishments. Current UES 
assets include these generation facilities, the grid, and the dispatch control unit, plus an 
interest in most of the regional distribution companies. Private UES shareholders will 
give up ownership of the grid and the dispatch unit in exchange for the full ownership of 
the generating units. Both the implied and stated intent of this treatment of UES share-
holders is to protect their property rights, and in so doing to attract more investment, es-
pecially foreign investment into the generation industry in Russia. 
The decree says that the retail rates charged by local distribution companies will 
be regulated and based on the market price of wholesale power.130 Furthermore, after 
some point, these distribution companies will be opened to competition by allowing di-
rect access to final customers by generation suppliers. The decree also says that the nu-
clear power plants will be consolidated into one company. 
B. The Gas & Oil Industries 
The petroleum industry, both oil and natural gas, is probably the most important 
economic sector in Russia. Clearly, the firms in this sector are the largest on an interna-
tional basis. Forbes ranked four companies from this sector in the 500 largest in the 
world. The magazine ranked Gazprom 138th with revenues of $17.708 billion in the year 
130 The decree does not specifically mention how the shares in the regional distribution companies 
will be dealt with. However, UES does not seem to get much in the way of dividends from these subsidiar-
ies. 
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200, LUKoil 180th with $14.431 billion revenues, Yukos 339th with $8.219 billion reve-
nues, and Surgutneftegaz 468th with $5.570 billion revenues. These Russian firms ran up 
in the Forbes ranking in 2000 because of higher oil prices, but still these are large firms. 
All are diversified petroleum companies. Gazprom is principally natural gas while the 
others have larger interests in oil. 
The petroleum industry is a major focus of foreign investment in Russia. Re-
cently, a consortium led by Royal Dutch Shell has signed a deal to build a $9 billion liq-
uefied natural gas facility on Sakhalin Island off Russia’s Pacific coast.131 However, this 
consortium has no Russia partners, possibly due to the fact that the security of foreign 
investment in Russia has been lacking in the past. British Petroleum, Williams Interna-
tional, and Norex Petroleum, Ltd., a Canadian company have all recently been caught up 
in legal disputes involving investments in association with Russian companies. 
Nonetheless, the rich petroleum resources of this part of the world attract eco-
nomic attention. The new $2.5 billion Kazakhstan-to-Russia 1,510 kilometer pipeline is 
about to open. Chevron is a 15 percent shareholder, the Russian government a 24 percent 
shareholder, and several Russian companies are partnered with other international oil 
concerns. Russian and China are also investigating a joint $1.7 billion oil/gas pipeline 
link. 
1. Gazprom 
Gazprom is the largest company in Russia. It accounts for 25 percent of world gas 
production and is the largest gas company in the world. It has 23.5 percent of the world 
proven reserves. It represented 8 percent of Russia gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 
and is the largest Russian tax paying entity. It is ranked in the top 100 companies in the 
world by market capitalization according to the Financial Times. 
Gazprom is a vertically integrated gas company controlling 65 percent of Russia’s 
gas reserves and 93 percent of production. Gas production and transmission are the core 
business representing 95 percent of revenues. The key assets are its reserves and its pipe-
line network 
The business is separated in 3 geographical units: Europe, the CIS and Russia. 
Gazprom is the largest supplier to the European market with a 31 percent market share. 
The supply of gas to European market is concentrated with 4 players: Russia, The Neth-
erlands, Norway and Algeria having a 60 percent market share. In the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary, and Romania, Gazprom is the only external supplier. Foreign sales ac-
counted for 54 percent of it revenue. 
2. Financial Structure & Corruption Scandals 
Gazprom is a “quasi-private” company. That is, it is a joint stock company in 
which the government owns about 38 percent of Gazprom, Russian shareholders about 50 
percent and 12 percent is own by foreign share holders. Officially 3.42 percent of the 
shares are traded on the market. Gazprom shares are traded in a two-tier structure and 
foreigners are prohibited to buy directly from domestic market. They have to buy Ameri-
can Depositary Receipts equal to 10 ordinary Russian trade shares that trade at 65 percent 
131 Wednesday, Jul. 18, 2001. Page 5, Sakhalin To Invest $9Bln in Gas Plant, Reuters. 
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premium to local shares.132 The share of foreign ownership in Gazprom may be allowed 
to increase to 20 percent but not more by law. This is the so called “ring-fence” market 
scheme. However, foreign shareholders used “gray schemes” to circumvent the two tier 
structure that, according to government estimates, have allowed foreign entities to ac-
quire more than 12 percent “possibly already up to 20 percent.”133 
Gazprom has been operated in hidden fashion in spite of the fact that shares are 
publicly traded. It has been the object of many allegations of scandal, corruption, and as-
set shifting. 
This year, especially after the replacement of Rem Vyakhirev from the position of 
company CEO with Alexei Miller, there were intense talks about removing the ring 
fence, measure that would allow Gazprom easier access to capital market and raise the 
market value of local shares, but that has been ruled out at least for the time being. 
3. Reform and Regulatory Restructuring 
The financial service Troika Dialog says: “In terms of hydrocarbon production, 
Gazprom is currently the world’s largest company, with 9.6 mln boe a day. [...]However, 
in terms of revenues which it receives for its output, the company is far down the table, 
because it sells around 60 percent of its output in Russia at a meager $14 per kcm, some 
12 percent of the current European natural gas price. More over, non payments in Russian 
and CIS market further dilute the value of Gazprom revenues. Russian domestic natural 
gas sales are price-regulated, capping the company revenues. The government forces 
Gazprom to subsidize the rest of the Russian economy by keeping domestic prices at ab-
normally low levels.”134 
Also the company quasi private status has had, according to Troika Dialog, a di-
rect effect on Gazprom governance. “At least until very recently, the government ‘s inter-
est in the company was primarily of tax collector and consumer, while its shareholder 
function was entirely neglected. The government didn’t control the management and did 
not strive to enhance the company’s profits.[…] As a result, Gazprom management was 
left to its own device and disheartened, or may be contrary, emboldened, by the lack of 
government emphasis, much to the frustration of private Russian and foreign sharehold-
ers who embarked on a shareholder rights crusade. The government interest in Gazprom 
management affairs became more acute recently, after changes in the Russian govern-
ment.” 
Part of the government interest was due to the critical situation of the company. 
Company had a poor cash collection in Russia and CIS countries, experienced severe 
cash shortages, reduced the investments and accumulated a huge maturing debt as a result 
of heavy borrowing in before 1998 crisis. As a consequence the company accumulated a 
132 Ninety-six percent according to Troika Dialog, Russian Oil and Gas Market, An Investment 
Primer, page 42. 
133 The sources for this paragraph: Gazprom: Foreign Ownership Cap to Stay, Dimitry 
Zhdannnikov, Reuters, Wednesday, August 8, 2001, page 5, “Gazprom Dumps Vyakhirev as CEO”, By 
Anna Raff, Staff Writer, Thursday, May 31, 2001, “Gazprom Proposals in the FSC’s Hands, by Anna Raff, 
Moscow Times, Thursday, July 26,2001. 
134 Troika Dialog, page 42. 
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$11 billion in debt,135 and now is facing a $2.5 billion in principal and investment each 
year. (Company net profits in 2000 were $ 2,964.6 million.) The current increase of the 
gas prices in Europe have alleviate somehow Gazprom problems in the short term. Also 
government tried to help Gazprom by raising domestic tariffs. 
One important step that government took was to shine light on the company 
opaque ownership structure, to inquire into the allegations of substantial assets striping, 
and to improve company corporate governance. In the same time, it started drawing plans 
for restructuring Gazprom, and liberalizing gas market. 
One the first front, Putin has install his own man as CEO, Alexei Miller, and has 
mandated that Gazprom clean up its act. Open accounting of revenues and profits are be 
the rule. Vyacheslav Sheremet, “a bastion of the old guard of former CEO Rem Vyak-
hirev”136 was released from its position as the head of Finance and Economics depart-
ment. Also the new CEO has operated important changes in the leading echelons of Gaz-
prombank, that controls a large part of Gazprom cash flows in an effort to reassert and 
strengthen the state control over the key area of the company. (Gazprombank is a sub-
sidiary in which Gazprom has 69.7 percent stake.)137 
On the second front, as a prelude to the sector restructuring and also a response to 
the strong lobby of oil companies Gazprom is being forced to give up control of its pipe-
line system. In the future, the pipeline system will become like a common carrier through 
which any producer can ship its gas on a non-discriminatory basis. This will have the ef-
fect of encouraging natural gas exploration and production by companies other than Gaz-
prom and will allow the wholesale natural gas market to become competitive, as it is in 
the U.S. 
Under current law, gas producers have the right to use the pipelines, but they 
complain that Gazprom’s prices are too high. As a decade-long monopoly over the gas 
pipeline network slowly slips from Gazprom's hands, oil companies are gleefully eyeing 
the sector with a view to expanding gas production. Oil executives hailed Prime Minister 
Mikhail Kasyanov's recent announcement that the government would separate Gazprom's 
production and shipping wings and open access to the gas transportation system to all 
natural gas producers. "We will start developing gas fields at an accelerated pace. Gas 
production in Russia will increase, and gas costs will go down," Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
head of Russia's second-largest oil producer, Yukos, said in a recent interview. He said 
Yukos would in five years produce 15 billion to 20 billion cubic meters of gas a year if 
Gazprom pipes were opened. Russian firms produce 60 billion cubic meters a year — 
more than Italy's annual consumption — but flare most of the output as they have no 
outlets for it.138 
However, one month later government back tracked and announced that Gazprom 
will keep its monopoly over the country’s natural gas exports, even after restructuring 
plan takes place. Some analyst argue that Russian government does not want Russian gas 
competing with Russian gas on the European market and driving gas prices down. Also 
135 $13.5 billion according to more recent estimates of Renaissance Capital, Thursday, September 
13 2001 8 “Gazprom To Sell Non-Core Assets.” 
136 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, “Sheremet Ousted By Miller,” Tuesday, September 4 
2001. 
137 See Troika Dialog, Russian Oil and Gas Sector, page 35. 
138 Friday, Jul. 27, 2001. Page 7, “Oil Majors Gushing Over Gas Pipeline Reform,” By Sujata Rao, 
Reuters. 
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was argued that this “means that Gazprom will continue to monopolize Russia’s gas sales 
on world markets, while Russian oil companies will be able to sell only at home, where 
tariffs are controlled”139 Russian government is willing to allow domestic gas tariffs in-
crease only gradually over the next five years. Government officials said that restructur-
ing of Gazprom will take a “long time” and the details will not be available earlier than 
the end of the year. The reasons for which Russian government reluctance to start gas 
sector reform may be the one that it will force Gazprom to stop subsiding domestic con-
sumers and this is a sensitive political issue, especially in a country where gas is a main 
source of heat. 
Gazprom exports revenues have been falling this year seemingly as a result of 
European gas market liberalization. This has meant no more long-term contracts for Gaz-
prom. The impact of this result on domestic restructuring is uncertain. 
Some plans to restructuring were announced by Gazprom board of directors. 
However, it was repeatedly stated by members of Gazprom management and of Russian 
government that “if the company is to be divided into production and transportation units, 
it will not occur until three to five years from now.”140 The Economic Development and 
Trade Ministry confirmed that “it would consider the restructuring of Gazprom not earlier 
than 2002.”141 
The restructuring of Gazprom is going to be realized in three stages 
- Stage one would involve spinning-off Gazprom’s non-core assets. 
- Stage two would entail the creation of a competitive gas market. 
- -Stage three would see the establishment of independent production and trans-
portation companies on the basis of Gazprom’s assets. 
In October this year the board of the company approved the plans to sell com-
pany’s non core assets the value of which is estimated at $1.6 billion and instructed the 
company executive committee to prepare by December 1 a list of assets to divest , list 
that will be submitted for approval of the Federal Property Fund.142 
Also the removal of the ring-fence restrictions was expected by investors by this 
year, especially after Miller appointment. A committee has been appointed by govern-
ment to analyze the merits of two tier structure. A new decree on liberalization of Gaz-
prom equity market has been issued In September company announced that liberalization 
of the equity market will proceed in 3 steps. ”First, Gazprom shares would be listed on 
more domestic trading floors; second, foreigners will be allowed to buy domestic shares; 
and third, the two-tier market would be fully consolidated.”143 However radical changes 
are likely to be postponed. Lately analyst agree an eventual removal of the ring fence is 
not going to happen earlier than next year. Also the 20 percent cap on foreign ownership 
is unlikely to be removed. 
139 Michael Lelyveld, “Government Backtracks on Gazprom Reform,” RFE/RL., Boston, August 
13,2001. 
140 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, 28 September 2001, “Gazprom H1 2001 Net Profit Up, 
Margins Shrink.” 
141 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, September 21 2001 Gazprom Reports Decline Of Its 
European Gas Exports.” 
142Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, Monday, October 1 2001 “Gazprom Board Does Not 
Surprise.” 
143 Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, Monday, September 10 2001. 
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